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INTRODUCTION

Fifty years ago, in 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in an
opinion by its new Chief Justice Warren Burger, issued a landmark
prisoners’ rights decision in Morrissey v. Brewer.1 It involved the constitutionality of a parole board’s revocation of paroles without a hearing, an issue that I had considerable involvement in during my law
1. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
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school years and the early years of my professional career with the
Legal Services Organization (LSO) of Indianapolis—including coauthoring an amicus curiae brief on behalf of Morrissey while the case
was pending before the Supreme Court. The fiftieth anniversary of the
Morrissey decision has provided the occasion to write a retrospective
on the historic decision and its legacy, including its continuing relevance today.
Celebrating Morrissey v. Brewer at 50! in the centennial edition of
the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW provides an in-depth examination of Morrissey and its progeny, Wolff v. McDonnell.2 In Wolff, the Supreme
Court extended due process protection to prison disciplinary decision
making and opened the federal courts’ doors to prisoners’ constitutional claims for the first time.3 Wolff also made a point that due process protections would apply to solitary confinement.4 Celebrating
Morrissey examined how Morrissey’s due process analytical framework was extended by Wolff v. McDonnell, Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,5 and Vitek v. Jones,6 but
was also limited in Meachum v. Fano.7 Wolff, Greenholtz, and Vitek
arose in the Nebraska correctional system, with the Nebraska Treatment & Corrections Act of 1969 (TCA) figuring prominently in each
decision.8 The Nebraska TCA was the catalyst for the Court’s initial
recognition of a state-created liberty interest in Wolff in 1974 and for
the state-created liberty interest holdings in both Greenholtz and
Vitek a few years later.9 Like Morrissey, Vitek was also based on the
2. Russell E. Lovell, II, In Celebration of Morrissey v. Brewer at 50! A Surprising
UNL LAW Back Story to the Prisoners’ Rights’ Due Process Landmark, 100 NEB.
L. REV. 905 [hereinafter Celebrating Morrissey]. See Celebrating Morrissey for a
discussion of this Author’s involvement in correctional and parole reform in Nebraska and the back story which resulted in his involvement in the appellate
stages of the Morrissey case. My article also provided the occasion to thank Harvey Perlman and the late Robert Kutak for their superb mentorship as we drafted
and negotiated the Nebraska Treatment & Corrections Act (TCA). Although he
was not involved in that legislative internship, the constitutional law and civil
procedure I learned from Professor Richard Harnsberger were directly relevant
to the 1968 Nebraska Law Review article and Amicus Curiae Brief I co-authored
in Morrissey. Dick was a wonderful mentor too, and he was a member of the UNL
law faculty with whom I remained in close touch. I always looked forward to a
cup of coffee or lunch with Dick on annual visits to Lincoln. Affable, goodhumored, with a twinkle in his eye, Dick Harnsberger’s kindness added immeasurably to my UNL Law school experience.
3. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
4. Id. at 564.
5. For a full discussion of Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), see Celebrating Morrissey, supra note 2.
6. For a full discussion of Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), see infra section I.D.
7. For a full discussion of Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976), see infra section
I.C.
8. See infra sections I.B, I.C, and I.D.
9. Id.
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“arising under the constitution” prong.10 The state-created liberty approach builds upon the genius of the federal-state system that allows
experimentation at the state level. Often that experience enables the
Court or Congress to fine-tune and fashion a nationwide rule. Readers
are directed to Celebrating Morrissey for detailed analysis of Morrissey
and each of the above-mentioned cases, as well as their continuing
relevance today.
This second Article, A Hijacking: The Remnants of Morrissey-Wolff
Due Process in Solitary Confinement after Sandin v. Conner, will examine the continuing evolution of due process protections for prisoners placed in solitary confinement. Prisoners’ rights in solitary
confinement and due process were additional areas in which I had extensive involvement with the Indianapolis LSO. Both were central issues in Aikens v. Lash,11 where the federal district court issued an
injunction that closed a 48-cell solitary confinement building at the
Indiana State Prison.12 After a brief refresher on Morrissey and Wolff,
this Article reviews the 1970’s and 1980’s caselaw that uniformly
found solitary confinement triggered a liberty interest requiring significant due process protections—Enomoto v. Wright,13 Hughes v.
Rowe,14 and Hewitt v. Helms.15 Wright and Hewitt held that due process attached not only to disciplinary segregation but also administrative segregation.16
This Article will then examine Sandin v. Conner in detail.17 In
1995 while the nation was experiencing a prison population explosion
during the War on Drugs,18 Chief Justice Rehnquist in Sandin crafted
a new test for determining when a liberty interest would be recognized
as arising under the constitution or by virtue of state law, which set
the stage for sharp curtailment of Morrissey-Wolff’s application in solitary confinement cases.19 Although the Chief Justice claimed that
10. See infra section I.D.
11. Aikens v. Lash, 371 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ind. 1974), aff’d, 514 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.
1975), vacated for further consideration on due process issues only, 425 U.S. 947
(1976), prior judgment and opinion reinstated as modified, 547 F.2d 372 (7th Cir.
1976).
12. See Celebrating Morrissey, supra note 2.
13. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978). See infra sections II.A, II.B, and II.C.
14. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 US. 5, 9 (1980). See infra section II.B.
15. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469 (1983). See infra section II.C.
16. See infra sections II.A and II.C.
17. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
18. Sentencing Project, Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENTENCING FACTS, https://
www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts/ [https://perma.cc/G5S2-248C]
(last visited Mar. 27, 2022). Michelle Alexander’s pathbreaking book, The New
Jim Crow, makes a powerful case that the Drug War, which officially began in
1982, has been the major contributor to America’s mass incarceration and to dramatic racial disparities. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2d ed. 2020).
19. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
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Sandin’s new test was a return to first principles, the dissents by Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, Breyer, and Souter vigorously disputed that
claim. We will find that Justice Breyer’s fear that Sandin was a
stealth ruling that had worked a radical change of law quickly proved
true. As construed by the federal circuit courts, Sandin essentially
eliminated due process protection in the imposition of solitary confinement in all but the most extreme cases.
A.

Morrissey v. Brewer (1972): Due Process Comes to Parole
Revocation

Iowa caselaw afforded no right to a hearing to a parolee when he or
she was charged with a violation of the conditions of parole. The Iowa
cases reasoned that parole was a privilege and therefore it could be
revoked by the state without having to demonstrate cause at a hearing.20 In its landmark Morrissey v. Brewer decision, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Warren Burger, the Supreme Court rejected
this right-privilege distinction, reasoning that while parole may be a
privilege, a person on parole has a liberty interest that cannot be revoked without due process.21 Morrissey recognized that a prisoner on
parole has a limited set of constitutional rights, and, while those
rights are not as robust as those of citizens who have not violated the
criminal law, they do include the right to due process of law.22 In the
Morrissey case, that meant that the State could not revoke his parole
without affording him a prior hearing at which he could seek to rebut
a charge that he violated the conditions of his parole, or, if he did commit a technical violation, that there were mitigating circumstances.23
Morrissey recognized there was a second stage to the due process
analysis, what it characterized as the “what process is due” stage.24
Although cautioning that the “full panoply of rights due a defendant
in a [criminal] proceeding does not apply to parole revocations,” the
Chief Justice held that due process required an evidentiary hearing
with significant procedural protections not only at the final hearing
before the parole board but also at the preliminary hearing stage.25
The Morrissey Court summarized “the minimum requirements of due
process” at the final parole board hearing:
They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in
person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer spe20. Curtis v. Bennett, 131 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1964); Cole v. Holliday, 171 N.W.2d 603
(Iowa 1969); Curtis v. Bennett, 351 F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1965).
21. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 484.
24. Id. at 484–90.
25. Id.
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cifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a ‘neutral and
detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which
need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.26

The Court emphasized that this more formal hearing process “should
be flexible enough to consider evidence including letters, affidavits,
and other material that would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial.”27
Wolff v. McDonnell (1974): Due Process Comes to Internal
Prison Discipline

B.

Let’s first study the big picture. Like Morrissey, it is important to
note that the Wolff Court was unanimous in holding (1) that due process protections attached to the prison’s revocation of good-time credits and (2) that, although not all of the Morrissey procedural
safeguards were found to attach in the prison discipline setting, the
following safeguards did:
[I]nmates are constitutionally entitled to advance written notice of the
charges against them and a statement of the evidence relied on, the facts
found, and the reasons supporting the disciplinary board’s decision. [A]n inmate is also constitutionally entitled to a hearing and an opportunity to speak
in his own defense.28

However, Justices Marshall and Brennan argued the Court had not
gone far enough while also acknowledging that “[t]hese are valuable
procedural safeguards, and I do not mean for a moment to denigrate
their importance.”29
In its application of Morrissey’s “grievous loss” threshold test,
which determines whether a liberty interest arises that is protected by
the constitution, Wolff found that due process protections applied
even though the revocation of good time was “qualitatively and quantitatively different from the revocation of parole or probation”30 involved in Morrissey and was not “the same immediate disaster that
the revocation of parole was for the parolee” in Morrissey.31 Thus, the
loss of good time credits, though not as severe a deprivation as revocation of parole, was significant enough to implicate the inmate’s liberty
interest that triggers due process protection. Because the Nebraska
statute limited forfeiture of good time to disciplinary rulings finding
“flagrant or serious” misconduct, Justice White, writing for the Court,
concluded that revocation of good-time credit constituted a grievous
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 489.
Id.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 581 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part).
Id.
Id. at 561.
Id. at 560–61.
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loss within the meaning of Morrissey.32 The Court held those due process precedents were fully applicable and, thus, “a person’s liberty is
equally protected, even when the liberty itself is a statutory creation
of the State.”33
Morrissey was the touchstone for the Wolff decision, but the statecreated liberty interest was an important difference. Morrissey found
a due process right arose because Iowa law deprived parolees of a liberty interest that was created under the constitution. Wolff found a
due process right arose because the Nebraska penal laws only permitted forfeiture of good time credit “[i]n cases of flagrant or serious misconduct.”34 This is a distinction that matters as to the scope of the
impact of these rulings. Morrissey’s ruling has nationwide impact,
binding on every state’s parole system; Wolff’s holding is binding on
the Nebraska prison system and, by analogy, to other states with statutes that have the same statutory protections before prison discipline
can be imposed.
Having found a state-created liberty interest that is protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Wolff Court held that the
amount of process due is determined by the federal constitution (not
merely by the process that may have been provided by state law).35 To
make this determination, the Court employed a balancing test that
considered “the precise nature of the government function involved as
well as of the private interest that has been affected by governmental
action.”36 The Court recognized that “the deprivation of good time is
unquestionably a matter of considerable importance” and that is confirmed by the State “reserv[ing] it as a sanction for serious misconduct.”37 Nonetheless, the Majority found that “the major consideration
militating against adopting the full range of procedures suggested by
Morrissey for alleged parole violators is the very different stake the
32. Id.
33. Id. at 558.
34. Id. at 546–47; see also NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107(1)–(2) (Cum. Supp. 1972) (providing for allowance of good time and explaining how it factors into parole eligibility, and the reductions of such terms “may be forfeited, withheld, and restored
by the chief executive officer of the facility . . . after the offender has been consulted regarding the charges of misconduct.”).
35. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 561 (1974).
36. Id. at 560 (citation omitted). Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), had not
yet been decided. It added a third factor: the risk of erroneous decision using the
existing procedures. Mathews’ three-part test to determine the sufficiency of due
process procedures in prisons remains the governing standard at Morrissey stage
two: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.” Id. at 335.
37. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560–61.
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State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing”38 which must take into account the reality of “the necessity to
maintain an acceptable level of personal security in the institution.”39
Based on this balancing test, the Majority held “that the inmate facing
disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do
so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals.”40
The dissent criticized the Court’s rulings that granted prison officials’ discretion as to whether and to what extent an inmate can present witnesses or other evidence, and that denied cross-examination
and the assistance of retained counsel. The dissent pointed to Chambers v. Mississippi for the importance of witness testimony: “Few
rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.”41
Although not necessary to the Court’s disposition of the constitutionality of revocation of good time without a hearing, the Wolff Court
made a powerful point by confirming that the same due process protections would have been applicable had the prison authorities sought
to impose solitary confinement as the discipline. The Wolff Court
noted:
[U]nder the Nebraska system, the same procedures are employed where disciplinary confinement is imposed. The deprivation of good time and imposition
of ‘solitary’ confinement are reserved for instances where serious misbehavior
has occurred. This appears a realistic approach, for it would be difficult for the
purposes of procedural due process to distinguish between the procedures that
are required where good time is forfeited and those that must be extended
when solitary confinement is at issue. The latter represents a major change in
the conditions of confinement and is normally imposed only when it is claimed
and proved that there has been a major act of misconduct. Here, as in the case
of good time, there should be minimum procedural safeguards as a hedge
against arbitrary determination of the factual predicate for imposition of the
sanction.42
38. Id. at 561.
39. Id. at 562–63 (also stating that “[t]he reality is that disciplinary hearings and the
imposition of disagreeable sanctions necessarily involve confrontations between
inmates and authority and between inmates who are being disciplined and those
who would charge or furnish evidence against them. Retaliation is much more
than a theoretical possibility; and the basic and unavoidable task of providing
reasonable personal safety for guards and inmates may be at stake, to say nothing of the impact of disciplinary confrontations and the resulting escalation of
personal antagonism on the important aims of the correctional process.”).
40. Id. at 566.
41. Id. at 583 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973)).
42. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571 n.19 (emphasis added). The Court explained: “When a prisoner is isolated in solitary confinement, there appear to be two different types of
conditions to which he may be exposed. He may be incarcerated alone in the
usual ‘disciplinary cell,’ with privileges severely limited, for as long as necessary,
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Six cases—Meachum v. Fano, Enomoto v. Wright, Vitek v. Jones,
Hughes v. Rowe, Hewitt v. Helms, Harper v. Washington—exemplify
the Supreme Court’s efforts to strike the right balance between procedural fairness for prisoners and prison administration concerns in the
two decades prior to Sandin. Meachum dealt with an important institutional matter: intraprison transfer of inmates and began early on to
define the limits of Wolff. Vitek and Harper held that the MorrisseyWolff procedural protections are required before an inmate can be
transferred to a prison mental health institution, distinguishing such
transfers from the prison-to-prison transfers in Meachum. Wright,
Hughes, and Hewitt confirmed Wolff’s application to both administrative and disciplinary solitary confinement.
C.

Meachum v. Fano (1976): Intrastate Prison Transfers to
Maximum Security Prison

The Meachum Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, held
that the Due Process Clause is not implicated in every change where
“the conditions of confinement [have] a substantial adverse impact on
the prisoner,”43 and that the transfer to a maximum-security prison
with more burdensome conditions was “within the normal limits or
range of custody which the conviction has authorized the State to impose.”44 Wolff was distinguished. First, unlike the forfeiture of goodtime credits, the prison transfers would not directly affect the length
of a prisoner’s incarceration; second, the inmates were not placed in
solitary or disciplinary confinement: “No [prisoner] was subjected to
disciplinary punishment upon arrival at the transfer prison. None of
the transfers ordered entailed loss of good time or disciplinary
confinement.”45
Justice Stevens, writing for Justices Brennan, Marshall, and himself, dissented because they were “unable to identify a principled basis
for differentiating between a transfer from the general prison population to solitary confinement and a transfer involving equally disparate
conditions between one physical facility and another.”46 Implicit in
this observation was recognition that imposition of solitary confinement triggered due process protections per Wolff.

43.
44.
45.
46.

or he may be put in a ‘dry cell,’ which unlike regular cells, contains no sink or
toilet.” Id. at 552 n.9.
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
Id. at 225.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 235. This observation confirms what appears to be the Court’s common
understanding, following Wolff v. McDonnell, that solitary confinement constituted a deprivation of liberty that required due process safeguards before its imposition. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).

236
D.
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Vitek v. Jones (1980): Prisoner Transfer to Mental
Hospital

Justice White, as he had done in Wolff and Meachum, wrote the
opinion for the Court.
1.

State-Created Liberty Interest

The district court found that Nebraska Revised Statute § 83-180(1)
gave Jones a liberty interest which required due process protection.47
Section 83-180(1) provides, in relevant part, that “a prisoner would
not be transferred unless he suffered from a mental disease or defect
that could not be adequately treated in the prison.”48 This reflected
not only law on the books, but the actual “practice” of the Nebraska
prison system.
Justice White, writing for the Court,49 held that these Nebraska
TCA statutes created a state-created liberty interest:
This “objective expectation, firmly fixed in state law and official penal complex
practice,” that a prisoner would not be transferred unless he suffered from a
mental disease or defect that could not be adequately treated in the prison,
gave Jones a liberty interest that entitled him to the benefits of appropriate
procedures in connection with determining the conditions that warranted his
transfer to a mental hospital.50

Despite some parameters it imposed in the context of intra-prison
transfers in Meachum v. Fano, the Court made clear that Morrissey
and Wolff provided the due process touchstone.51 Citing Enomoto v.
Wright,52 Justice White pointed out that “following Meachum . . . we
continued to recognize that state statutes may grant prisoners liberty
interests that invoke due process protections when prisoners are
transferred to solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative
reasons.”53
2.

Liberty Interest Created Under the Constitution

The Court also found that a liberty interest arose directly under
the constitution, pointing to precedent that found involuntary commitment is “more than a loss of freedom” and “can engender adverse social consequences.”54 The Court noted Jones’s experience at the prison
system’s mental hospital which “[c]ompelled treatment in the form of
47. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487–88 (1980).
48. Id. at 483.
49. The Majority was comprised of five Justices. Justice Stewart wrote a dissent for
himself, the Chief Justice, and Justice Rehnquist; Justice Blackmun wrote a separate dissent. All four dissenters argued that the case was moot.
50. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489–90.
51. Id. at 488.
52. Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
53. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489.
54. Id. at 492 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425–26 (1979)).
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mandatory behavior modification programs.”55 Justice White extensively discussed the much greater restrictions that are experienced by
inmates who have been transferred pursuant to an involuntary commitment to a psychiatric prison hospital. Not only is the inmate deprived of the general population prison living circumstances, the
psychiatric hospital’s behavior modification therapy is very intrusive
on the inmate’s personal security, so much so that such transfers of
persons in the outside world are only permissible after a civil commitment hearing.
The Court concluded that the proposed transfer to a mental hospital in Vitek would work not merely a major change in the status quo,
but a “deprivation of liberty.”56 More specifically, the Court stated:
“[T]he stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for
involuntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the
prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for
mental illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that requires procedural protections.”57 In sum, the Court rejected the
State’s argument that transfer to a mental hospital is within the permissible range of confinement options for inmates: “Such consequences visited on the prisoner are qualitatively different from the
punishment characteristically suffered by a person convicted of a
crime.”58
3.

Full Morrissey Procedural Safeguards Are The “Process Due”

The Court then turned to Morrissey stage two, “what process is
due.” With one minor tweak of the district court’s injunction, the
Court held that the Morrissey procedural protections must be afforded
a prisoner whose transfer to a mental hospital has been proposed:
“(A) Written notice;” “(B) [A]n opportunity to be heard in person and to present documentary evidence;” “(C) An opportunity at the hearing to present
testimony of witnesses” and a qualified right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses; “(D) An independent decisionmaker;” “(E) A written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for transferring the inmate;” “(F) [T]he assistance of “legal counsel, furnished by the
state, if the inmate is financially unable to furnish his own; and” “(G) Effective
and timely notice of all of the foregoing rights.”59

The Court modified (F) to provide the district court with greater discretion as to whom to appoint, adding licensed psychiatrist or other
mental health professional to the lawyer option.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

494–96.
494.
493.
494–95.
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Washington v. Harper (1990)

In Washington v. Harper, the Court noted that the Special Offender Center (SOC), a correctional institute established by the Washington Department of Corrections, had developed SOC Policy 600.30
“in partial response to this Court’s decision in Vitek v. Jones” holding
that due process protections applied to prisoner transfers to mental
hospitals.60 Policy 600.30 was a detailed regulation intended to provide clear administrative guidance as to when an inmate could involuntarily be administered psychotropic medications and as to what
procedural safeguards must be provided to protect the individual inmate’s personal autonomy interests.61
In a 6-3 opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Court examined
the state regulation which “permit[ed] a psychiatrist to treat an inmate with antipsychotic drugs against his wishes only if he is found to
be (1) mentally ill and (2) gravely disabled or dangerous” and concluded “the Policy creates a justifiable expectation on the part of the
inmate that the drugs will not be administered unless those conditions
exist.”62 The Court also held “that, in addition to the liberty interest
created by the State’s Policy, [the inmate] possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic
drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”63
Following Vitek’s embrace of full-Morrissey procedures as its compass, Justice Kennedy concluded that the procedures set forth in the
SOC departmental regulations satisfied due process in all respects:
“The Policy provides for notice, the right to be present at an adversary
hearing, and the right to present and cross-examine witnesses.”64 The
dissenters expressed considerable concern about the independence of
the internal decision-making process. Because of the adequacy of the
procedures developed by the institution, the Court Majority held it
would not speculate about theoretical deficiencies.65

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 (1990).
Id. at 215–16.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 221–22.
Id. at 235.
The Majority found the procedures sufficient because they prohibited anyone “involved in the inmate’s current treatment or diagnosis” from acting as a decisionmaker. Id. at 233. They further found that there was no evidence that “any
institutional biases” impacted “the decision to medicate respondent against his
will,” and, therefore, they would not “presume that members of the staff lack the
necessary independence to provide an inmate with a full and fair hearing in accordance with the Policy.” Id.
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The Common Ground Between Morrissey and VitekHarper, and How Vitek-Harper Differed from
Morrissey

As it did in Morrissey, the Supreme Court in Vitek and Harper
found a liberty interest arose directly under the federal constitution.
In addition, Vitek and Harper found an alternative ground for their
holdings, that a state-created liberty interest arose under the Nebraska statutes in Vitek and the Washington State SOC regulations in
Harper. There could be no such state-created liberty interest holding
in Morrissey as the Iowa caselaw was in direct conflict with parolee
Morrissey’s federal constitutional due process rights.
By looking to state statutes that it found created liberty interests
triggering due process protections in Wolff, Greenholtz, Vitek, Harper,
and Hewitt, the Court expanded due process protections in prison discipline in situations where it was not comfortable fashioning a nationwide constitutional rule. Harper based its finding of a state-created
liberty interest on the detailed prison regulations promulgated by
state correctional authorities; there was no indication in Justice Kennedy’s opinion that he relied on a state statute. When the Court concludes that the state has created a liberty interest, it will apply a
federal constitutional lens. It will examine whether the process afforded in state statutes, prison regulations, and practice satisfies the
Mathews three-factor “what process is due” test, and, if not, will hold
that federal courts can impose additional procedural safeguards,
above and beyond any contained in the state legislation and prison
regulations. By authorizing representation by a court-appointed advocate, including one with psychiatric expertise but not necessarily a
lawyer, the procedural safeguards in Vitek were the full MorrisseyScarpelli complement.
II. THE SOLITARY CONFINEMENT DUE PROCESS
PRECEDENTS
A.

Enomoto v. Wright (1978)

In 1978, four years after Wolff, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment in Enomoto v. Wright. The three-judge federal
district court explained its reasoning:
When a prisoner is transferred from the general prison population to the
grossly more onerous conditions of maximum security, be it for disciplinary or
for administrative reasons, there is severe impairment of the residuum of liberty which he retains as a prisoner[,] an impairment which triggers the requirement for due process safeguards.66
66. Enomoto v. Wright, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff’d, 434 U.S. 1052
(1978).
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As is typical of summary affirmances, the Supreme Court affirmed the
district court’s judgment without writing an opinion.67 Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, dissented on a jurisdictional issue,
but the dissent did not take issue with the district court judgment on
the merits. A summary affirmance is binding on the lower courts, but
it “affirms the judgment of the lower court only and not necessarily
the reasoning by which it was reached.”68 However, scholars Nowak
and Rotunda observed that a summary affirmance “is not as binding
on the Supreme Court as would be one of its own more considered
opinions.”69
Wright was an inmate in California’s San Quentin prison who
brought a class action “challeng[ing] the [California prison system’s]
procedures resulting in confinement of inmates in maximum security
units for ‘administrative’ reasons.”70 The three-judge federal district
court found that “In many cases, prisoners have been confined in solitary for days sometimes for weeks before any hearing. In some cases,
inmates have been so confined and not told the reasons, even informally, until appearance before the Committee.”71
Although recognizing that Meachum placed limits on Wolff’s statecreated liberty interest rationale, the Court instructed that WolffMeachum held “that if the state itself imposed limits on [prison authorities’] discretion . . . the state creates a liberty interest which is
67. Id.
68. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting
Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391–92 (1975). The Court explained that a
summary affirmance “should not be understood as breaking new ground but as
applying principles established by prior decisions to the particular facts involved.” Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176. See also JOHN NOVAK & RONALD ROTUNDA,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: at 30 n.17 (6th Ed. West Pub. Co. 2000) (citing Mandel v. Bradley).
69. NOVAK & ROTUNDA, at pg. 31 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671
(1974)). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Edelman, observed that while
“summary affirmances obviously are of precedential value . . . [e]qually obviously,
they are not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court
treating the question on the merits.” Id.
70. Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 398–99. The district court made the following findings as
to the conditions of confinement in the maximum security cells:
Prisoners in the maximum security units are confined in cells approximately five feet wide by eight feet long. The cells are without fresh air or
daylight, both ventilation and lighting being poor. The lights in some
cells are controlled by guards. It is difficult for prisoners to get needed
medical attention. They must eat in their cells or not at all. They are
allowed very limited exercise and virtually no contact with other prisoners. They cannot participate in vocational programs. They are denied
those entertainment privileges provided for the general prison population. Parole is usually denied to them until after release from maximum
security segregation.
Id. at 399 (footnote omitted).
71. Id. at 400.
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protected by due process.”72 The Court found that “the inmate has an
interest, conferred by statewide regulation and protected by due process, in not being confined in maximum security segregation unless he
is found, for clearly documented reasons, to come within the standard
sets by the rules.”73
The district court summarized the Wolff due process protections
and modeled its injunction so as to include each element:
An opportunity to appear before the decision-making body; written notice of
the charge against him in advance of the hearing; an opportunity to present
witnesses and documentary evidence “when (it) will not be hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals”; a written statement of the reasons for
the decision to punish him and of the evidence on which it is based; and, if he
is illiterate or if the issues are complex, counsel-substitute (either a fellow
inmate or a member of the prison staff) to help prepare his defense.74

The district court held: “Defendants [prison officials] have made no
showing that inmates confined in maximum security for administrative reasons are in fact given prior notice, a hearing, and a written
decision.”75 Nor have the officials made any “showing that prison administration or safety will be jeopardized if defendants are required to
accord plaintiffs at least the minimal protections called for by Wolff in
the case of disciplinary sanctions.”76 The Court concluded that the
Wolff procedures were “essential if the inmate is to have any chance
whatever to prove that he does not represent a risk to the security of
the institution and thereby to avoid subjection to the severe deprivations of confinement in maximum security.”77
The Court expressed deep concerns about “defendants’ arbitrary
practices in imposing administrative segregation,” especially the
vague allegations and the potential abuse of the indefinite duration
that is common to administrative segregation.78 The Court stated it
would defer its decision “as to whether even more procedural protections must be required for such confinement for administrative reasons.”79 When disciplinary segregation is invoked its purpose is
punitive, but the court explained it was particularly concerned about
the indefinite nature of administrative segregation:
The deprivation suffered by a prisoner confined for administrative reasons is
greater than that suffered by one confined on a disciplinary charge. The latter
is for a definite term, generally for a maximum of ten days. In contrast, administrative segregation is for an indefinite period [and] the prisoner may be
confined for months, even years, without hope of release. The charges at a
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 402.
at 403.
at 401.
at 403.
at 404.
at 403 (emphasis added).
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disciplinary hearing are definite and narrow. The inmate is accused of violating a prison rule. In contrast, as is evidenced by plaintiffs’ exhibits, the
charges at a hearing resulting in administrative confinement tend to be
vague, and are frequently based on mere rumor, suspicion, or conjecture.80

B.

Hughes v. Rowe (1980)

On September 20, 1977, the inmate “was charged with a violation
of prison regulations and placed in segregation.”81 A disciplinary hearing was held two days later, where he admitted to drinking a homemade alcoholic beverage.82 He was confined to segregation for ten
days and thirty days’ good-time was forfeited.83 After he exhausted
his internal administrative remedies, he filed pro se a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 suit in federal district court alleging he was placed in a segregation cell prior to his hearing, without justification, because there
was no “emergency or other necessity.”84 The district court dismissed
the inmate’s section 1983 civil rights action, and this dismissal was
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit.85 The Seventh Circuit concluded that
the inmate was afforded the necessary procedural safeguards at his
hearing on September 22.86
The Supreme Court, in an unsigned per curiam opinion,87 reversed
the Seventh Circuit, holding that “[s]egregation of a prisoner without
a prior hearing may violate due process if the postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions.”88 The Court found that the Seventh Circuit had overlooked the
inmate’s factual allegation that “the disciplinary hearing did not take
place until two days after [the inmate] was placed in segregation on
September 20.”89 The Court held that the inmate’s complaint was sufficient to proceed to trial on his “claim that he was unjustifiably placed
in segregation without a prior hearing.”90 The Court explained that
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 403–04 (internal citation omitted).
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 US. 5, 7 (1980).
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id.
One scholar noted:
Most cases accepted for review by the Supreme Court proceed to plenary
consideration-full briefing, oral argument, and a full opinion signed by
the author . . . When there is plenary treatment, the likelihood is that
the Court will issue a signed opinion . . . The Court also gives summary
treatment to some cases . . . Summary treatment, however, may result in
a full but unsigned opinion, designated per curiam, or ‘by the Court.’
Stephen L. Wasby et al., The Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76
JUDICATURE 29, 29–30 (1992).
88. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 11 (1980).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 12.
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the inmate’s complaint “alleged that segregation was unnecessary in
[his] case because his offense did not involve violence and he did not
present a ‘clear and present danger.’ ”91 Although the DOC regulations
“authorized segregation of prisoners pending investigation of disciplinary matters, where required ‘in the interest of institutional security
and safety,” the Court pointed out there was no “showing that concern
for institutional security and safety was the basis for immediate segregation of [the prisoner.]”92 The State put on no evidence explaining
why he was placed in segregation in advance of his hearing.93
The Court Majority does not expressly state that it found a liberty
interest arising under the constitution, but it is evident that was its
holding. First, there is no mention in the Majority opinion of any Illinois statute or prison regulation as a basis for finding a state-created
liberty interest. Without any discussion of a state-created liberty interest, the Court likely thought the obvious default would be the arising under the constitution branch of due process analysis and
therefore it need not be more explicit. Indeed, in Morrissey itself, the
Court did not expressly state the parolee’s liberty interest arose under
the constitution.
Justice White “agree[d] with the result in Part II . . . [as] a prior
hearing was required for the particular disciplinary action involved
here-segregation and loss of good time.”94 But, citing Wolff, he contended that the due process “procedural protections were triggered
only because under state law—here prison regulations—segregation
and good-time reduction could be imposed only for serious disciplinary
lapses and only after a prior hearing.”95 Justice White also commented that if the prisoner succeeded on remand, “it is likely only
nominal damages would be available” since he “had a full hearing
within 48 hours of his confinement.”96
Justice White’s concurrence confirmed that the Court’s holding
was based on the arising under the constitution branch of Morrissey
due process analysis, and not on the Wolff state-created liberty interest branch, as he concurred only “with the result in Part II”97—the
due process issue. Consistent with Justice White’s concurrence “with
the result,” the Majority did not cite Wolff for its stage one analysis as
to whether there is a liberty interest protected by due process; in a
footnote it cited Wolff, but only for the specific stage two hearing pro91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

11.
12 (citation omitted).
9.
16 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).

at 17.
at 16 (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).
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cedures Wolff held constituted the “process due” when a liberty interest was found in the prison disciplinary setting.98
With Justice White’s concurrence, there was a six-member Majority. Chief Justice Burger “would grant the [certiorari] petition” and
“set the case for oral argument.”99 Justice Stewart “would affirm the
judgment of the Court of Appeals insofar as it affirmed the District
Court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s complaint,” but he did not join
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent. Justice Stewart did not explain his decision, but since he joined the Wolff and Wright opinions that embraced
due process protections as generally applicable to the imposition of
solitary confinement, it certainly is possible his disagreement with the
Majority was only that any injury the inmate experienced from a twoday delay in the provision of a hearing was de minimis.
Justice Rehnquist dissented, contending the prehearing segregation was proper because the inmate had admitted to being intoxicated;100 even if the inmate did not represent “a threat to prison
security,” his “removal from the general prison population for a brief
period was fully justified in order to protect the integrity of the later
hearing before the review board”101 as that ensured that he could not
develop a “contrived defense.”102 Furthermore, if there was error, Justice Rehnquist contended it was harmless because the inmate subsequently received a fair hearing two days later.103
The Court Majority responded to the dissent in considerable detail.
Its refutation contended that the factual record does not support the
conclusions asserted by Justice Rehnquist.104 The Majority also
argued:
Even if the subsequent hearing accorded petitioner minimized or eliminated
any compensable harm resulting from the initial denial of procedural safeguards, his constitutional claim is nonetheless actionable . . . for nominal
damages without proof of actual injury.105

It is important to point out that Justice Rehnquist did not dispute
the overriding principle that due process hearing protections generally apply before solitary confinement can be imposed. The fighting
issue was the prison’s failure to provide a probable cause preliminary
hearing before placing the inmate in segregation even though it provided him with a full hearing two days later. The Hughes case, thus, is
especially notable because it holds that solitary confinement—even for
a time period as short as two days—can constitute a deprivation of
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

23 n.6.
16.
20.
21 (footnote omitted).
13 n.12.

(citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978)).
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liberty when it is imposed without affording an inmate due process.106
It is fair to say that the Hughes Court’s holding was the high-water
mark for due process protections in the context of solitary confinement.107 Unquestionably, it is a per curiam opinion “in which the
Court ma[de] substantive law. This is most obvious when the Court
hands down a ruling that looks every bit like a signed opinion except
for the per curiam label, or when it reaches the merits without argument. These include rulings on the substance of procedural law.”108
C.

Hewitt v. Helms (1983)

Nine years after Wolff, in Hewitt v. Helms, the Court engaged in its
most extensive examination of due process in the context of solitary
confinement in the era preceding Sandin. In an opinion authored by
Justice Rehnquist, the Court addressed a prisoner’s claim that his
confinement in administrative segregation violated his constitutional
right to due process at both the probable cause stage and at the periodic review stage.109
After a riot in the Pennsylvania State Prison, Helms was confined
to administrative segregation while he was being investigated for his
role in the riot.110 Helms was charged with misconduct.111 On December 8, 1978, Helms had an opportunity to provide his version of events
to a Hearing Committee, but the record was unclear whether he was
allowed to appear in person and the committee made no finding.112
Criminal charges were filed, but subsequently dropped.113 While the
internal investigation went on, “a Review Committee concluded that
[Helms] should remain in administrative segregation” because he
posed a threat to other prisoners and to prison security.114 On January 22, 1979, the Hearing Committee dropped the initial disciplinary
charge but, based on a guard’s testimony, found Helms guilty of a revised misconduct charge and ordered him confined to disciplinary segregation for six months.115
106. Id.
107. We will find that fifteen years later those protections were significantly cut back
in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
followed by dramatic retrogression in the circuit court progeny that followed
Sandin. See infra section III.B. The strength of Hughes’ per curiam holding will
be very relevant to the third article’s contention that Sandin v. Conner should be
revisited and modified, or even overruled.
108. Wasby, supra note 87, at 34.
109. The inmate did not challenge the constitutionality of the disciplinary hearing
that was afforded him.
110. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
111. Id. at 464.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 465.
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The Third Circuit held that the governing Pennsylvania prison
statutory framework gave rise to a liberty interest and remanded to
determine whether Helms’ initial hearing on December 8, 1978 satisfied the Wolff procedural requirements.116 The initial hearing was
limited to the prison’s imposition of indefinite “ ‘administrative segregation’ [which lasted] for over seven weeks—from the evening of December 3, 1978 until January 22, 1979—before he received an
evidentiary hearing, and he was then sentenced to six months in ‘disciplinary custody.’ ”117
The Supreme Court reversed, with Justice Rehnquist writing the
opinion for the Court. The Court concluded that the Pennsylvania
statutes did give rise to a state-created liberty interest, but the nonadversary hearing procedures afforded to Helms on December 8, 1978,
satisfied due process.118 The Court unanimously agreed that the prisoner had a state-created liberty interest which triggered Fourteenth
Amendment due process protection in avoiding seven weeks of administrative segregation, but the Court split 5-4 on the Morrissey second
stage “what process is due” issue. The four dissenting justices contended that the majority erred in finding that nonadversary hearing
procedures satisfied due process at the probable cause stage of the investigation.119 The dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens also forced
the Majority to acknowledge that due process requires periodic review
of administrative segregation due to its indefinite nature.120
1.

The State-Created Liberty Interest

Justice Rehnquist emphasized Wolff’s recognition of the “broad administrative and discretionary authority” granted prison administration because of its “extraordinarily difficult undertaking” and that
“our decisions have consistently refused to recognize more than the
most basic liberty interests in prisoners.”121 In dictum that was the
basis for major disagreement with the dissent, the Court observed
that “administrative segregation is the sort of confinement that inmates should reasonably anticipate receiving at some point in their
incarceration.”122 The Court explained:
The phrase “administrative segregation,” as used by the state authorities
here, appears to be something of a catchall: it may be used to protect the pris116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 466.
Id. at 481 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 476–77.
See id. at 479 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
Compare id. at 490–96 (Stevens, J. dissenting), with id. at 477 n.9 (Rehnquist,
J.).
121. Id. at 467 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974)).
122. Id. at 468. There is no empirical or other authority cited for this conclusion, just a
vague statement: “This conclusion finds ample support in our decisions regarding
parole and good-time credits.”
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oner’s safety, to protect other inmates from a particular prisoner, to break up
potentially disruptive groups of inmates, or simply to await later classification
or transfer.”123

After a lengthy exposition to the effect that the “daily operations of
a prison system [seldom] confer any liberty interest,”124 the Court
held: “[I]n the light of the Pennsylvania statutes and regulations . . . [the] respondent did acquire a protected liberty interest in
remaining in the general prison population.”125 It was apparent from
the above discussion that the Court experienced some angst in reaching its decision. In seeking to emphasize the narrowness of the Court’s
holding, Justice Rehnquist explained that the liberty interest was not
based on “the mere fact that Pennsylvania has created a careful procedural structure to regulate the use of administrative segregation . . . .”126 The differentiating factor was that the state’s statutes
and regulations “used language of an unmistakably mandatory character, requiring that certain procedures ‘shall,’ ‘will,’ or ‘must’ be employed, and that administrative segregation will not occur absent
specified substantive predicates—viz., ‘the need for control,’ or ‘the
threat of a serious disturbance.’ ”127
2.

Stage Two: What Process Is Due

In applying the Mathews factors, Justice Rehnquist found that the
inmate’s “private interest is not one of great consequence. He was
merely transferred from one extremely restricted environment to an
even more confined situation.”128 The Court found that each of the
“two closely related reasons” stated by correctional officials “for confining Helms to administrative segregation prior to conducting” his disciplinary hearing was of “great importance.”129 Justice Rehnquist
elaborated:
First, they concluded that if housed in the general population, Helms would
pose a threat to the safety of other inmates and prison officials and to the
security of the institution. Second, the prison officials believed that it was
wiser to separate respondent from the general population until completion of
123. Id. (internal citation omitted). This dictum would portend what was to come a
dozen years later in Sandin v. Conner.
124. Id. at 469.
125. Id. at 470–71 (footnote omitted).
126. Id. at 471. The Court also articulated a policy argument that it “would be ironic to
hold that when a State embarks on such desirable experimentation it thereby
opens the door to scrutiny by the federal courts, while States that choose not to
adopt such procedural provisions entirely avoid the strictures of the Due Process
Clause.” Twelve years later, Chief Justice Rehnquist renewed this same policy
argument, characterizing it as a disincentive, in Sandin v. Conner.
127. Id. at 471–72.
128. Id. at 473.
129. Id.
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state and institutional investigations of his role in the December 3 riot and
the hearing on the charges against him.130

Prison administrators, when they assess the seriousness of a
threat to institutional security, Justice Rehnquist observed, “draw on
more than the specific facts” of the incident, but also the “character of
the inmates,” “longstanding relations between prisoners and guards,”
“and the like.”131 Justice Rehnquist stated such “intuitive judgments . . . would not be appreciably fostered by the trial-type procedural safeguards . . . .”132
The Court concluded: “[T]he Due Process Clause requires only an
informal nonadversary review of evidence . . . in order to confine an
inmate feared to be a threat to institutional security to administrative
segregation.133 The Court emphasized that the administrative hearing as to Helms’ confinement to administrative segregation should be
viewed as a probable cause determination, and not the final misconduct hearing that would determine disciplinary segregation. The
Court found that Helms “had an opportunity to present a statement to
the Committee”134 and therefore due process did not require procedural protections beyond those he received:
An inmate must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an
opportunity to present his views to the prison official charged with deciding
whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Ordinarily a written
statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose, although prison administrators may find it more useful to permit oral presentations in cases where
they believe a written statement would be ineffective.135

The issue of whether due process requires periodic review of a prisoner in administrative segregation was in response to the contention
in Justice Stevens’s dissent that administrative segregation, if not
closely monitored, can be abused because of its indefinite nature.136
Justice Rehnquist agreed in general: “Of course, administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an
inmate.”137 Justice Rehnquist provided few details, and examination
of his response will make more sense after the dissent’s contentions
are set forth below.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 474.
at 477.
at 476.
at 477 n.9.
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The Dissent: The Indeterminate Risk of Administrative
Segregation

The dissent, authored by Justices Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun, focused on the conditions of solitary confinement experienced by Helms, noting that administrative segregation and disciplinary segregation were “in all material respects” the same and that the
conditions in both were “significantly more restrictive than those experienced by inmates in the general prison population.”138 The dissent
emphasized that Helms was “held in ‘administrative segregation’ for
over seven weeks—from the evening of December 3, 1978 until January 22, 1979—before he received an evidentiary hearing, and he was
then sentenced to six months in ‘disciplinary custody.’ ”139
As he had contended in his dissent in Meachum, Justice Stevens
argued that the liberty interest that triggers due process protections is
rooted in a person’s inalienable rights, and therefore cannot turn on
state law, which is subject to the whim of the legislature or prison
authorities.140 The Majority’s reasoning, therefore, has “a fundamental flaw” in relying on written prison regulations to find a state-created liberty interest as, in doing so, it “attaches no significance either
to the character of the conditions of confinement or to actual administrative practices in the institution.”141 In Justice Stevens’ view, citing
Morrissey v. Brewer and Vitek v. Jones, “the relevant question in this
case is whether transfer into administrative segregation constitutes a
‘sufficiently grievous’ change in a prisoner’s status to require the protection of ‘due process.’ ”142
138. Id. at 479 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because of the unique
harshness of the isolation that is inherent in solitary confinement, it cannot be
“balanced” without understanding what it entails and the restrictions that customarily attach to it. Only then can one begin to grasp its inhumanity. Justice
Stevens quoted Helms’ “uncontroverted affidavit” in footnote one:
While confined in segregation I had no access to vocational, educational,
recreational, and rehabilitative programs as I would have had while out
in the general population. Exercise was limited to between five and ten
minutes a day and was often only three or four days a week. Showers
were virtually nonexistent in segregation in December and January. The
changing of clothes was also only once or twice a week while I could have
changed more often in population. Had I been in general population I
would have had access to various exercise facilities such as the gym and
the yard and would have been able to do this for most of the time out of
my cell which would have been approximately 14 hours a day. While in
segregation I only got out of my cell a few minutes for exercise, showers
and an occasional visit. I was virtually confined there 24 hours a day
otherwise.
139. Id. at 481.
140. Id. at 482.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 484 (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492 (1980)) (then citing Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
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The dissent pointed out that “for a prisoner as for other persons,
the grievousness of any claimed deprivation of liberty is, in part, a
relative matter: one must compare the treatment of the particular
prisoner with the customary, habitual treatment of the population of
the prison as a whole.”143 Here, the institutional norm was the “general prison population.” Justice Stevens stressed that “administrative
segregation” is “solitary confinement” and “[t]hat confinement was not
specified by the terms of his initial criminal sentence. Not only is
there a disparity, but the disparity is drastic.”144 Justice Stevens cited
Wright and Wolff for the proposition that solitary confinement represents “grossly more onerous conditions of maximum security, be it for
disciplinary or for administrative reasons.”145 Justice Stevens contended the Court essentially ignored its summary affirmance in
Wright and its considered statements in Wolff footnote nineteen and
Vitek.146
a.

The Interim Probable Cause Hearing

Justice Stevens agreed with the Court “that the Constitution does
not require a hearing with all of the [Wolff] procedural safeguards . . . when prison officials initially decide to segregate an inmate
to safeguard institutional security or to conduct an investigation of an
unresolved misconduct charge.”147 However, the dissenters disagreed
with the Majority’s denial of a right to make an oral presentation at
the prison officials’ probable cause determination; the dissent strongly
contended that due process requires that the inmate be given the opportunity to present in person to the reviewing officials.148 As many
prisoners have little education, limiting an inmate to a written statement is unlikely to provide a “meaningful opportunity to be heard.”149
b.

The Periodic Review

Justice Stevens went on to emphasize that his disagreement with
the Majority went far beyond its holding that a written statement satisfied the due process requirements at the probable cause determination. “Of greater importance,” Justice Stevens explained, “the
majority’s due process analysis fails to provide adequate protection
143. Id. at 486.
144. Id. at 487 (footnote omitted).
145. Id. at 487–88 (quoting Enomoto v. Wright, 462 F. Supp. 397, 402 (N.D.
Cal.1976)). The dissent also referenced Wolff in a footnote, noting Wolff’s statement that administrative segregation imposed for disciplinary reasons “represents a major change in the conditions of confinement,” and, therefore, triggers
due process. See id. at 497 n.15.
146. Wright, 462 F. Supp. at 403.
147. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 489–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 489 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 490 (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–69 (1970)).
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against arbitrary continuation of an inmate’s solitary confinement.”150
While Justice Rehnquist agreed that due process principles were applicable to indefinite solitary confinement, the ambiguity in his statement—”prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review” of
inmates in administrative segregation—and its placement solely in its
concluding footnote suggested to the dissent that only “minimal review” was contemplated.151 The Court said very little, but with what
little it said, the Court indicated it envisioned a very limited review:
“This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit
the submission of any additional evidence or statements.”152 The dissent contended such a “minimal review” does not satisfy due process,
which “requires a more searching review of the justifiability of continued confinement.”153
Justice Stevens acknowledged that the two major justifications
given by prison authorities as justification for Helms’ administrative
segregation could serve important governmental interests, “[b]ut it
cannot fairly be assumed that either rationale, though it might initially be adequate, remains valid or sufficient indefinitely.”154 Justice
Stevens suggested that the majority “simply ignores the passage of
time” while one is in administrative segregation and that conditions
“simply do not remain static.”155 The dissent asserted that “due process demands periodic reviews that have genuine substance—not
mere paper-shuffling” and concluded that two procedural safeguards
were necessary to ensure each periodic review satisfied due process.156 First, prison authorities should be required to provide the inmate the opportunity to appear in-person and verbally speak to the
“consequences of continued confinement.”157 Second, the decisionmaker should be required to furnish a brief, written statement explaining the reasons to the prisoner if the authorities order continued
solitary confinement.158
It should be recalled that the Wright Court’s concern about the
abuses that can arise due to the inherent ambiguity of many of the
reasons used to justify administrative segregation and its indefinite
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
Id. at 477.
Id. at 490 n.9.
Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 491.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 495. Hewitt is complicated, so a synopsis of its holding may be helpful.
Hewitt held that due process required (1) notice and at least an opportunity for
the prisoner to submit written submissions at the probable cause stage when administrative segregation was invoked while the prison investigated whether to
commence a disciplinary proceeding and (2) “some kind” of periodic review during
indeterminate administrative segregation.
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duration was such that it suggested that the Wolff procedures were
the minimum floor, and that greater protections might be required.
The arbitrariness and abuses of administrative segregation which
were so clearly demonstrated in the facts in Wright were not evident
in Hewitt.159 In sum, the Hewitt facts—both with regard to the governing state statutes and prison regulations that the legislature enacted and prison officials had promulgated, and the state’s eventual
provision of a Wolff evidentiary hearing to Helms—cast the State and
its prison administration in a much more favorable light than was the
case with the California prison system in Wright. This Author will
elaborate on this point in Article Three, as he believes it is understandable that the Court may have taken Pennsylvania’s conscientious efforts into account when it engaged in the Mathews three-factor
analysis at the “what process is due” stage.
III. SANDIN V. CONNER (1995): THE FEDERAL COURTS’
“HANDS OFF” POLICY MAKES A COMEBACK AS
COURT CURTAILS DUE PROCESS
PROTECTIONS IN SOLITARY
CONFINEMENT
Wolff had foreseen that the balance of interests it struck in 1974
might be different in the future “as the problems of penal institutions
change and correctional goals are reshaped.”160
While few, if any, commentators could foresee the dramatic
changes that were to take place in the U.S. penal system beginning a
decade or so later, Wolff was prescient that criminal justice policy is
not static:
Our conclusion that some, but not all, of the procedures specified in Morrissey
and Scarpelli must accompany the deprivation of good time by state prison
authorities is not graven in stone. As the nature of the prison disciplinary
process changes in future years, circumstances may then exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this Court.161

The body of caselaw examined in Part I was developed during the
Burger Court years, which concluded with the Chief Justice’s retire159. Justice Rehnquist noted “that on January 2 a Program Review Committee considered whether Helms’ confinement should be continued . . . [and] [t]his review,
occurring less than a month after the initial decision to confine Helms to administrative segregation, is sufficient to dispel any notions that the confinement was a
pretext.” Id. at 477–78 n.9. Justice Stevens was not satisfied as “the record does
not adequately disclose the reasons for [Helms’] prolonged confinement” nor is it
clear the January 2 review proceedings, and Helms’ appearance before the committee, satisfied due process. Id. at 496–97.
160. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 568 (1974).
161. Id. at 571–72 (footnote omitted).
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ment in 1986.162 Based on the perception that federal courts had become too involved in minor matters of prison administration, the
Rehnquist Court significantly cut back on the state-created liberty interest caselaw that had developed over the prior two decades. Its first
opportunity to do so came in 1995. In Sandin v. Conner, authored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court revisited the issue of due process
in the context of solitary confinement and turned that body of law upside down.163 Sandin significantly curtailed the due process protections afforded prisoners placed in solitary confinement.164
Sandin occurred during the explosion in the nation’s prison population. In light of the Wolff observation that due process is not graven
in stone and that changes in prison discipline practices can require
the Court to reconsider its rulings, it seems a certainty that the expansion of the prison population, and the accompanying problem of
overcrowding, were contextual factors the Court took into account.
The prison population in federal and state prisons in the United
States increased from 196,429 in 1970 to 1,610,446 in 2008, a staggering increase of 820 percent!165 Viewing Sandin as a benchmark, the
prison population in 1996 was 1,137,322—nearly a 600 percent increase from 1970.166
The Prison Litigation Reform Act,167 which significantly curtailed
prisoner litigation in the federal courts, had not been enacted in 1995
when Sandin was decided. Although the legislative winds favoring
curtailment of prisoner litigation were blowing strongly with the new
Republican majority Congress in 1995, the outcome of such reform
was uncertain when Sandin was pending before the Court because
such proposed legislation, if enacted, would still be subject to a possible veto by President Bill Clinton.168
162. Warren E. Burger Biography, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Warren-E-Burger [https://perma.cc/9YK2-YPY3] (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
163. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
164. Wilkinson v. Austin came a decade later and involved application of Sandin’s
“atypical, severe hardship” test in the context of the extraordinary isolation that
is solitary confinement in the Ohio Supermax prison. See generally Wilkinson v.
Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005). Wilkinson found a state-created liberty interest that
warranted limited due process protections and will be examined closely in this
Author’s third article. Wilkinson was decided in 2005, three years before the
prison population peaked in 2008.
165. Criminal Justice Facts, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, https://www.sentencingproject
.org/criminal-justice-facts [https://perma.cc/6SCJ-K35A] (last visited Oct. 2,
2021).
166. Id.
167. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–34, tit. VIII, § 803, 110
Stat. 1321, 1321–71 (1996).
168. The PLRA “was signed into law by President Bill Clinton after passing through
Congress, including the Senate Judiciary Committee—of which Joseph R. Biden
was the ranking minority member—with nary a peep from Democrats.” John
Boston, 25 Years of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PRISON LEGAL NEWS, https://
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Sandin v. Conner: Remnants of Due Process in Solitary
Confinement

Conner was an inmate in a maximum-security prison in Hawaii.169
After an altercation with a guard in which he was strip searched and
his rectal area inspected, Conner “retorted with angry and foul language directed at the officer.”170 He was charged with “disciplinary
regulations”171 for “ ‘high misconduct’ for using physical interference
to impair a correctional function, and ‘low moderate misconduct’ for
using abusive or obscene language and for harassing employees.”172
Conner appeared before an adjustment committee, but his request to
present witnesses was denied by the committee because the witnesses
were not available.173 The committee found Conner guilty and sentenced him to thirty days’ disciplinary segregation for the physical obstruction charged, and four hours segregation for each of the other two
charges to be served concurrent with the thirty days.174 Conner
served the thirty-days’ segregation but “pursued an administrative
appeal,” which concluded the high misconduct sentence was “unsupported and expunged Conner’s disciplinary record with respect to that
charge.”175
Conner brought a section 1983 suit against the Hawaii prison officials for damages. The Ninth Circuit concluded “that Conner had a
liberty interest in remaining free from disciplinary segregation and
that there was a disputed question of fact with respect to whether
Conner received all of the process due under . . . Wolff v.
McDonnell.”176
In a 5-4 decision, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme
Court reversed.177 The Chief Justice revisited caselaw that recognized
that a liberty interest could be created by state law beginning with
Wolff and Meachum, and critically concluded that some strands of
that caselaw, including Hewitt, had mistakenly focused on the language of a particular regulation—for example, whether the regulation
“was mandatory or discretionary”178—and not the nature of the depri-

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2021/aug/1/25-years-prison-litigation-reform-act/
[https://perma.cc/6NDT-ESMG] (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 488 (1995).
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 475–76.
Id. at 476–88.
Id. at 476.
Id. at 473, 488.
Id. at 479.
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vation.179 The Chief Justice asserted there were “at least two undesirable effects” of this misguided focus:
First, it creates disincentives for States to codify prison management procedures in the interest of uniform treatment. Second, [it] has led to the involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons, often
squandering judicial resources with little offsetting benefit to anyone.180

Another unwitting result, the Chief Justice asserted, was this caselaw
“encouraged prisoners to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to various state-conferred
privileges.”181
1.

The New Test: The Pendulum Swings Back Too Far

The Chief Justice opened his analysis of the constitutional issue by
stating: “Our due process analysis begins with Wolff,” and explained
the Nebraska “statutory provision created a liberty interest in a
‘shortened prison sentence’ which resulted from good time credits,
credits which were revocable only if the prisoner was guilty of serious
misconduct.”182 That was the Court’s clearest explanation of what it
suggested was merely a restatement of first principles. Asserting that
a course correction was required, with only cryptic explanation the
Court crafted an entirely new test:
The time has come to return to the due process principles we believe were
correctly established and applied in Wolff and Meachum. Following Wolff, we
recognize that States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests
which are protected by the Due Process Clause. [T]hese interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due
Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life.183

In what can only be described as a very awkwardly worded paragraph, Sandin ostensibly created a dual test of when a liberty interest
was created that would require Fourteenth Amendment due process
protection.184 First, such a liberty interest can arise under the federal
constitution if the state’s action, by prison authorities or a parole
board, “exceed[s] the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to
give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force.”185
The Court cited Vitek v. Jones and Harper v. Washington, cases in
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 472.
Id. at 482 (citation omitted).
Id. at 481.
Id. at 477–78 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974)).
Id. at 483–84 (internal citations omitted).
See Sharif A. Jacob, The Rebirth of Morrissey: Towards a Coherent Theory of Due
Process for Prisoners and Parolees, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 1213, 1226 (2006) [hereinafter Rebirth of Morrissey].
185. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 483–84.
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which inmates were transferred to psychiatric hospitals without having been civilly committed. Second, “following Wolff . . . States may
under certain circumstances create liberty interests . . . [b]ut these
interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint
which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”186
It was clear that the Chief Justice and the Majority contemplated a
reduced role for the federal courts in prisoner due process cases and
prison litigation generally. It was also clear that the Court was rolling
back the due process protections it had previously formulated in cases
involving solitary confinement. The dissenters were fearful that the
sweep of Sandin’s new test would roll back protections far beyond the
Sandin facts and might dramatically limit the federal courts’ role in
prison discipline cases.
Wolff had expressly based its finding of a state-created liberty interest on a key provision in the Nebraska TCA, but it is not apparent
how its facts—a forfeiture of good-time credit for prison misconduct—
falls under Sandin’s test for state-created liberty interests: “freedom
from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on
the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.”187
Rather, Wolff seems to better fit the Sandin “test” for a liberty interest
arising under the constitution because of the effect that loss of goodtime has on the calculation of the time that an inmate must serve of
his or her prison sentence.
The Chief Justice reaffirmed Wolff’s holding that due process is applicable to good-time revocation because the heightened statutory protections in Nebraska Revised Statute section 83-185 coupled with
actual prison practice created a liberty interest protectable by due process.188 But the Chief Justice’s attempt to thread the needle in Sandin
and Meachum fell short. Despite Wolff’s subsidiary holding that section 83-185 also triggered due process protections for solitary confinement disciplinary cases, Sandin went on to hold that thirty-days’
disciplinary segregation was not a significant deprivation requiring
due process protection.189 Likewise, Sandin embraced Meachum’s
holding and reasoning, and explained: “[T]he Due Process Clause does
not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a
substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.”190 However, the Chief
Justice did not mention that Meachum emphasized that none of the
prisoners involved in the intrastate prison transfers had been placed
in solitary confinement.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

484.
472.
483–84.
486–87.
478 (citations omitted).
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The “Exceed[s] The Sentence In Such An Unexpected Manner”
Test

The Court’s test embraced Vitek and Harper, which involved involuntary transfer to a state mental hospital and involuntary treatment
with anti-psychotic medications, as examples of when a liberty interest arises under the Due Process Clause of its own force.191 Although
the Court concluded that the thirty days’ solitary confinement that
Conner experienced did not implicate a liberty interest arising under
the constitution, the Court never explained why. The Court also did
not explain what distinguished the transfers to mental health hospitals in Vitek and Harper from transfers to solitary confinement, in
light of the Court’s precedent that had uniformly held that solitary
confinement did trigger due process protection.192
One can think of potential distinctions, but this Author is not convinced they are meaningful. One distinction might be duration. The
transfers to the state mental hospitals would be viewed as indefinite
or indeterminate, quite possibly lasting throughout the term of the
prisoners’ sentences; in contrast, Conner’s disciplinary segregation
was limited to thirty days. Another distinction might be severity. Conner would likely argue that the exceptional isolation of solitary confinement carries with it substantial risks of claustrophobia and
paranoia that can push prisoners without a mental illness diagnosis
over the edge and into clinical depression or worse; and for prisoners
who have a mental illness diagnosis, solitary confinement can push
them into the abyss of a significantly aggravated mental illness diagnosis. Conner might also argue that prisoners transferred to a state
mental hospital have been transferred for a benign purpose of treating
the prisoner’s mental illness; there is no such benign intention when a
prisoner is punished for a disciplinary violation and the harshest punishment in the prison’s disciplinary arsenal is imposed. Vitek and
Harper emphasize a stigma often attached to a transfer to a prison
mental hospital; Conner would reply there is also a stigma attached to
solitary confinement, that such prisoners are considered “the baddest
of the bad” or “incorrigible” and that stigma can adversely affect them
throughout their years in prison and can adversely affect their
chances for parole.
In sum, the total lack of an explanation of the Court’s reasons for
concluding Conner had not made out an arising under the constitution
liberty interest undermines any claim that its holding is entitled to
deference or stare decisis precedent. The Court’s failure to provide any
guidance as to the test’s arising-under the constitution claim has also
confounded the lower courts in the years since Sandin. Although only
191. Id. at 484.
192. See generally, supra Part II.
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a limited examination of the post-Sandin federal circuit caselaw was
conducted, arising-under claims almost never figure into the circuit
court analyses—perhaps under the assumption that such claims have
been subsumed by the “atypical and significant hardship” test forged
for state-created liberty interest claims.193
Finally, the Sandin test included what appeared to be a favorable
citation to Board of Pardons v. Allen, and that was puzzling given the
rationale for the new test.194 Whatever the explanation for the citation of Allen, the Court in Wilkinson v. Austin, albeit ten years later,
left no doubt that Allen has no continuing precedential value after
Sandin.195
3.

The Court’s Application of Its “Atypical, Significant
Hardship” Test

Sandin held that “Conner’s discipline in segregated confinement
did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a
State might conceivably create a liberty interest,” but the Court offered only cryptic explanations and murky guidance.196 It made a
comparison of the conditions of disciplinary segregation with those of
administrative segregation and concluded that “disciplinary segregation, with insignificant exceptions, mirrored those conditions imposed
upon inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody.”197 It noted the expungement of the solitary confinement disci193. See Rebirth of Morrissey, supra note 184, at 1227–28 (footnotes omitted):
In order to avoid the appearance of disrupting precedent from Wolff forward, the Court needed to maintain at least a nominal difference between liberty interests that are protected ‘by the Due Process Clause of
its own force’ and those created by the states. However, distinguishing
between state-created and constitutional interests amounts to nothing
more than a subtle reference to Morrissey’s tripartite taxonomy. . . . But
regardless of the nominal classification as state-created or constitutional, the Fourteenth Amendment now provides protection solely as a
function of the nature and weight of the deprivation.
194. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). If there was any doubt that the
Sandin Court would find a state-created liberty interest in the Allen or Greenholtz parole release processes under the Sandin “atypical, significant hardship”
test, that doubt was eliminated ten years later in Wilkinson. “Although Sandin
abrogated Greenholtz’s and Hewitt’s methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level
of procedural safeguards.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 229 (2005). Although Wilkinson declined to explain Sandin’s repudiation of Greenholtz’s “methodology,” it appears the Court would conclude that the denial of an oral
presentation opportunity to a prisoner at the parole release hearing would not
constitute the “atypical, significant hardship” Sandin requires.
195. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 229 (“Although Sandin abrogated Greenholtz’s and
Hewitt’s methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards.”).
196. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486.
197. Id.
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pline from Conner’s record following his successful administrative
appeal of the misconduct decision, and accompanying footnote ten asserted “he personally has no chance of receiving a delayed release
from the parole board as a direct result of that allegation.”198
The Chief Justice’s observation seems to be pure speculation. The
next sentence set out a conclusion: “Thus, Conner’s confinement did
not exceed similar, but totally discretionary, confinement in either duration or degree of restriction.”199 This vague comment is confusing as
there was no discretionary confinement; Conner was not placed in administrative segregation. More likely, although Conner was wrongfully held in solitary confinement for thirty days, he should not
experience any further detriment since his wrongful “conviction” on
the misconduct charge has since been expunged. There is also a comparison to the conditions of the general population, noting these inmates experience “significant amounts of ‘lockdown time’ ” and, in its
accompanying footnote eight, the Court noted that “[g]eneral population inmates are confined to cells for anywhere between 12 and 16
hours a day, depending on their classification.”200 The Chief Justice
states that the Court’s conclusion that “the State’s actions in placing
him [in solitary confinement] for 30 days did not work a major disruption in his environment” was “[b]ased on a comparison between inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation.”201
As the Court never describes the conditions and restrictions of
Conner’s solitary confinement, one must turn to Justice Breyer’s dissent to learn that Conner was allowed out of his cell less than one
hour each day and then was in “leg irons and waist chains.”202 The
Court never explained why solitary confinement for twenty-three
hours per day with waist chains and leg irons for the one hour per day
outside one’s cell is not severe when compared to those in the general
population who, even on days there are lockdowns, are allowed out of
their cells eight to twelve hours per day. The Court also never explained why a comparison to the conditions and restrictions placed on
prisoners in the general population is not the exclusive measure of
comparison to the conditions and restrictions the prisoner would experience if placed in solitary.
Pre-Sandin there was no atypicality component to the grievous
loss test; its focus was on the severity of the hardship or deprivation.
The term “atypical” cannot be found in either of the lodestar Morrissey
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 487 n.10.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 486 n.8.
Id. at 486.
“Conner, for 30 days, had to spend his entire time alone in his cell (with the exception of 50 minutes each day on average for brief exercise and shower periods,
during which he nonetheless remained isolated from other inmates and was constrained by leg irons and waist chains).” Id. at 494.
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or Wolff opinions. The Court never explained what authority it based
its “atypicality” comparison on between the conditions of “disciplinary
segregation” and the conditions of “administrative segregation.”203
Such a straw man comparison is based on a false dichotomy, as Circuit
Judge Richard Posner would observe, because in most prisons the conditions and restrictions of disciplinary and administrative segregation
are essentially the same.204 To justify a conclusion that disciplinary
segregation is not severe or atypical because it is not dissimilar to administrative segregation is fallacious.
The Sandin Court instructed that, in determining whether due
process attached to the thirty days’ solitary confinement discipline imposed on Conner, the lower court should consider the duration and
degree of restriction of the solitary confinement imposed, the nature of
prison life in the Hawaiian prison in question, and the inmate’s indeterminate sentence of thirty years to life.205 The Court never explained the significance of an inmate’s underlying sentence to this
determination. And, the Court did not point to any data that would
support a finding that an inmate who has a long sentence is almost
certain to have experienced administrative segregation, and having
likely experienced it at least once, that somehow makes it is less severe the next time. It is widely known that people “age out” of crime,
and it seems likely they age out of misconduct within the prison setting, too.206 Without proof based on his prison misconduct record, this
Author submits the Court cannot fairly infer from Conner’s thirty
years-to-life indeterminate sentence that he has become so hardened
that confinement to solitary is not severe or atypical.207 The Court’s
203. The Chief Justice’s opinion was criticized by the lower courts as cryptic, vague,
and murky. See, e.g., Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 583 (2d Cir. 1999) (“The
Sandin ruling has generated several issues. . . . Fortunately, we need not consider all of these issues.”).
204. For a full discussion of Wagner v. Hanks, see infra Subsection II.B.1.
205. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485–86 (1995).
206. See e.g., BB Benda & TJ Pavlak, Aging Out of Crime – A Neglected Area of Juvenile Delinquency Theory Research and Practice, NEW DESIGNS FOR YOUTH DEVELOPMENT, Vol. 4, Issue 6, 21–27 (1983), https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/
abstracts/aging-out-crime-neglected-area-juvenile-delinquency-theory-research
[https://perma.cc/3GKR-UA6A] (last visited Mar. 27, 2022); see also Caitlin Cornelius & Christopher Lynch, Aging Out of Crime: Exploring the Relationships
Between Age and Crime with Agent Based Modeling, (2017), https://scs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/06/6_Final_Manuscript.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WMX4MBY] (last visited Mar. 27, 2022).
207. Award-winning author Kenneth Hartmann served thirty-eight years in California state prisons before his sentence was commuted and he was granted parole
and released. I found Hartmann’s writings in the Solitary Watch describing what
he experienced during eleven different occasions in solitary confinement moving
and eye-opening:
But placement in the hole, contrary to the [Sandin] court’s analysis, is
always a significant event for the man or woman placed there. The only
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summation made clear that the required showing to establish a liberty
interest protected by due process essentially incorporated the Eighth
Amendment: “This case, though concededly punitive, does not present
a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of Conner’s indeterminate sentence.”208 It is impossible to distinguish Sandin’s “atypicality” and “dramatic departure” terminology from the “unusual” prong
of the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause.
There were several other passages in the Court’s opinion that confirm the gloss over of the Eighth Amendment the Court imposed to
limit the scope of due process protections. The Court found that “the
State’s actions in placing him there for 30 days did not work a major
disruption in his environment.”209 The Chief Justice observed that a
solitary confinement misconduct sanction on Conner’s record will not
“inevitably affect the duration of his sentence. Nothing in Hawaii’s
code requires the parole board to deny parole in the face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its absence, even though misconduct
is by regulation a relevant consideration.”210 The Court noted it had
rejected a similar claim regarding the effect a transfer to a higher security prison might have on parole chances in Meachum, and that
Conner would have the opportunity “to explain the circumstances behind his misconduct record” at his parole hearing.211
4.

The Court Gave Short Shrift to Its Precedent

You may ask, what about the Court’s due process solitary confinement precedent, from Wolff through Wright, Hughes, and Hewitt?
Near the opinion’s conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist finally addressed the inmate’s argument that the Ninth Circuit’s due process
ruling was supported by the Court’s existing precedent that held “solitary confinement automatically triggers due process protection.”212
The Court gave this argument short shrift, brushing the precedent
aside in one sentence by asserting: “[T]his Court has not had the opportunity to address in an argued case the question whether disciplinary confinement of inmates itself implicates constitutional liberty
interests.”213 The Chief Justice apparently sought to dismiss “as

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

times that suicide ever felt like a viable option to get out from under the
long, slow death sentence of life without the possibility of parole happened when I was in the hole.
Kenneth E. Hartman, Inside the Hole: The Experience of Solitary Confinement in
California, MEDIUM (Feb. 18, 2020), https://medium.com/@kennethehartman/inside-the-hole-cf79de81cfd [https://perma.cc/383M-YUX9].
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added).
Id. at 486 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 487 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 485.
Id. at 486.
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dicta” the Wolff Court’s unanimous statement that, due to the statecreated liberty interest, due process protections applied when solitary
confinement was imposed and the Vitek Court’s key distinction that
“following Meachum . . . we continued to recognize that state statutes
may grant prisoners liberty interests that invoke due process protections when prisoners are transferred to solitary confinement for disciplinary or administrative reasons.”214
Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the holdings of Wright, Hughes,
and Hewitt. While Wright, as a summary affirmance may not carry
“the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this Court
treating the question on the merits,”215 the Chief Justice himself acknowledged it has precedential weight. Indeed, Wright has considerable precedential weight as Vitek expressly cited Wright as precedent
for a state-created liberty interest whenever solitary confinement
might be imposed and, further, held that Wright confirmed this principle continued as the governing law after Meachum.216 Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote a jurisdictional dissent in Wright, but his dissent did
not contest the merits of Wright’s due process holding.217
In a per curiam opinion, the Hughes Court held that solitary confinement of two days triggered due process protections arising under
the constitution.218 Chief Justice Rehnquist in Sandin does not even
acknowledge the existence of Hughes—even though the Court wrote a
full opinion in Hughes. Without mentioning it by name, the Chief Justice appears to have cast Hughes aside because it was not “an [orally]
argued case.”219 He cited no authority for this distinction, and the definitive Judicature article on the “nature and functions” of per curiam
opinion reports no such distinction.
The most recent of these precedents was Hewitt, whose Majority
opinion was authored by Justice Rehnquist. The Hewitt Majority held
that a liberty interest had been created by the Pennsylvania statutes
and regulations when administrative segregation was imposed for
seven weeks, only three weeks longer than the disciplinary segregation in Sandin. The dissent would have forged a broader precedent,
contending that a liberty interest arose directly under the constitution. But the Hewitt Court was unanimous that a state-created liberty
interest had been created that required due process protection.220
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489–90 (1980).
Edelman v Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489–90.
Enomoto v. Wright, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10–11 (1980).
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). “[T]his Court has not had the opportunity to address in an argued case the question whether disciplinary confinement of inmates itself implicates constitutional liberty interests.” Id.
220. Justice Blackmun joined the five-member Hewitt Majority in holding that inmate
Helms had a state-created liberty interest in avoiding segregation that was pro-
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Without any meaningful consideration of these four cases and the
principles of stare decisis, the Sandin Court effectively overturned two
decades of its precedents in one paragraph.
5.

The Dissents: Justices Ginsburg-Stevens and Breyer-Souter
a.

Justices Ginsburg & Stevens

Dissenting Justices Ginsburg and Stevens agreed that the determination of a state-created liberty interest “should not depend on the
particularities of the local prison’s code,” but they contended that the
imposition of solitary confinement imposes severe hardships and
therefore implicates a liberty interest directly under the constitution
itself “in avoiding the disciplinary confinement he endured.”221 Justice Ginsburg wrote:
Disciplinary confinement as punishment for “high misconduct” not only deprives prisoners of privileges for protracted periods; unlike administrative
segregation and protective custody, disciplinary confinement also stigmatizes
them and diminishes parole prospects. Those immediate and lingering consequences should suffice to qualify such confinement as liberty depriving for
purposes of Due Process Clause protection.222

Conner received notice of the charges and was allowed to personally
answer them before the committee.223 Therefore, the dissent acknowledged the inmate had been provided two of the Wolff procedural protections. However, since the committee “denied his request to call as
witnesses staff members he said would attest to his innocence,” the
dissent would subject the prison officials’ explanation that the “witnesses were unavailable” to examination on remand.224

221.
222.

223.
224.

tected by due process. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983). Justice
Stevens and his dissenting colleagues, Justices Brennan and Marshall, would
have found a liberty interest arose directly under the constitution. Id. at 488.
Sandin, 515 U.S. at 488–90 (citations omitted).
Id. at 488–89 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Neither in Morrissey, nor subsequent
cases, has the Court ever stated with any specificity the source of the liberty interest in the Constitution. Justices Ginsburg and Stevens eloquently argued in
their dissenting opinion in Sandin that each person has a liberty interest that
can be found among the “ ‘unalienable Rights’ with which all persons are endowed
by their Creator,” but their view has never commanded a majority. Id. at 489.
The word “natural right” has not appeared in any of the Court’s opinions, although that is how many commentators characterize the liberty interest protected by due process. While there continues to be ambiguity on the precise locus
of this right—even after fifty years—what is clear about Morrissey, Vitek, and
Harper, is that an individual’s liberty interest can arise under the Constitution
when the State’s actions cause a “grievous loss” even when the relevant state
statute denies such an interest exists. Clearly, when Morrissey’s parole was revoked, there was nothing remotely like a liberty interest in parole under Iowa
law.
Id. at 488 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 475, 488 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting), 504 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Justices Breyer & Souter

Citing Vitek and Harper, Justice Breyer noted:
[T]his Court has said that certain changes in conditions may be so severe or so
different from ordinary conditions of confinement that, whether or not state
law gives state authorities broad discretionary power to impose them, the
state authorities may not do so “without complying with minimum requirements of due process.”225

These “general pre-existing principles” required due process protections under the arising-under prong:
[T]he punishment worked a fairly major change in Conner’s conditions. In the
absence of the punishment, Conner, like other inmates in Halawa’s general
prison population would have left his cell and worked, taken classes, or mingled with others for eight hours each day. As a result of disciplinary segregation, however, Conner, for 30 days, had to spend his entire time alone in his
cell (with the exception of 50 minutes each day on average for brief exercise
and shower periods, during which he nonetheless remained isolated from
other inmates and was constrained by leg irons and waist chains.).226

Justice Breyer briefly summarized several of the Court’s due process
solitary confinement cases as precedent supporting the arising-under
basis.227
Principally citing Hewitt, Justice Breyer then explained that Conner was also entitled to due process based on a state-created liberty
interest: “[I]rrespective of whether this punishment amounts to a deprivation of liberty independent of state law, here the prison’s own disciplinary rules severely cabin the authority of prison officials to
impose this kind of punishment.”228 While Hewitt ultimately rejected
the inmate’s due process claim based on its conclusion that the Pennsylvania prison officials afforded Helms all the process he was due, the
Hewitt Court was unanimous on the issue in Sandin that Justice
Breyer saw as decisive—that when the state has “cabined” the authority of prison officials to impose solitary confinement due process protections are triggered.
Based on both lines of precedent, the dissenters viewed disciplinary solitary confinement an extreme form of punishment that can
only be imposed on prisoners found to have committed high misconduct determined in a hearing that afforded the inmate the Wolff due
process protections.229 Since Conner was not allowed to call witnesses,
225. Id. at 493. (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Although Morrissey was not
cited, the liberty interest in Morrissey clearly arose from the Constitution alone.
226. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
227. Id. In his dissent, Justice Breyer summarized Hughes and Wolff. Under Hughes,
disciplinary “[s]egregation of a prisoner without a prior hearing may violate due
process if the postponement of procedural protections is not justified by apprehended emergency conditions.” Id. Under Wolff, “solitary confinement . . . ‘represents a major change in the conditions of confinement.’ ”Id.
228. Id. at 494 (emphasis in original).
229. Id. at 495–96.
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the four dissenting Justices would have remanded the case to the district court so that Conner would have “an opportunity to point to ‘specific facts’ that might explain why these witnesses (or other
procedures) were needed.”230
So, the dissent disagreed with the disposition of the case on its
facts. However, what alarmed Justice Breyer was the majority’s new
test whose sweep and breadth went far beyond the facts of the Conner
case.231 Justice Breyer expressed fear that the Court’s new “atypical,
significant hardship” test, though ostensibly only a restoration of first
principles, could “change prior law radically.” Justice Breyer further
contended the new test’s sweep far exceeded the scope of the identified
problem and:
There is no need . . . for a radical reading of this [existing] standard, nor any
other significant change in present law, to achieve the majority’s basic objective, namely, to read the Constitution’s Due Process Clause to protect inmates
against deprivations of freedom that are important, not comparatively
insignificant.”232

Justice Breyer then explained that the state-created liberty
caselaw only is relevant in a “middle category of imposed restraints or
deprivations that, considered by themselves are neither obviously so
serious as to fall within, nor obviously so insignificant as to fall without, the Clause’s protection.”233 Further, Justice Breyer argued that
the better approach would continue to look to state law when there is
“difficult line-drawing . . . [in] this middle category” of cases and to
clearly explain that current “standards will not create procedurally
protected ‘liberty’ interests where only minor matters are at stake.”234
Justice Breyer would have held that Conner was deprived of a statecreated liberty interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause:
“In sum, expungement or no, Conner suffered a deprivation that was
significant, not insignificant. And, that deprivation took place under
disciplinary rules that . . . do cabin official discretion sufficiently.”235
B.

The Circuit Courts’ Solitary Confinement Caselaw
Confirms a “Vanishing” Due Process Right

No attempt will be made to comprehensively summarize the complex body of caselaw that has sought to apply the Sandin “atypical,
significant hardship” test. My purpose for dipping into the circuit
court caselaw has principally been to ascertain whether Sandin has
worked the radical law change its dissenters feared. What becomes
230. Id. at 504.
231. For further discussion of how the facts in Sandin hid the impact of its “atypical,
significant hardship” test, see infra Subsection V.C.4.
232. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 496.
233. Id. at 497.
234. Id. at 496–97.
235. Id. at 502 (internal citation omitted).
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very clear is that none of the circuits have concluded that the thirty
days’ solitary confinement upheld in Sandin is the upper limit in duration that would be allowed without due process procedural safeguards. While there are significant differences within the circuits,
with the exception of the Second Circuit, due process protections are
not triggered when solitary confinement is imposed except in circumstances that would have been considered egregious in the pre-Sandin
era. My brief overview is intended as support for that conclusion, and
also to point out the Second Circuit’s post-Sandin approach because I
believe it provides a framework based on duration of the confinement
that can be helpful in developing the reforms that I will propose in
article three.
On the continuum of circuit court cases, the Second Circuit holds
down the most moderate position. But how moderate can the Second
Circuit be when it holds that due process protections do not come into
play until the duration exceeds ten months if the prisoner has been
placed in a “typical” solitary confinement condition? The Fifth Circuit
appears to have erased due process from solitary confinement cases
except in draconian circumstances.
1.

The Seventh Circuit

The Seventh Circuit’s Chief Judge Richard Posner was known for
his legal realist views. Early on, in Wagner v. Hanks, he explained
that due process claims in the solitary confinement setting were futile
because “under Sandin the key comparison is between disciplinary
segregation and nondisciplinary segregation rather than between disciplinary segregation and the general prison population.”236 Under
this comparison the Chief Judge denied a claim challenging one year
of administrative segregation, pointing out that the prisoner will
rarely be able to prove “atypicality” “because the prison is likely to
provide facilities for, and create conditions of, administrative segregation and protective custody that are virtually identical to the facilities
for and conditions of disciplinary segregation, and no more is necessary under Sandin to deny the prisoner’s claim.”237 Thus, Chief Judge
Posner spoke Sandin’s hard truth: “the right to litigate disciplinary
confinements has become vanishingly small.”238
There are exceptions to Chief Judge Posner’s far-reaching observation about Sandin ending due process protections in solitary confinement cases but, in large part, it has proven true. The exceptions are
236. Wagner v. Hanks, 128 F.3d 1173, 1175 (7th Cir. 1997).
237. Id. at 1174–75.
238. Id. at 1175. “[W]hen the entire sanction is confinement in disciplinary segregation for a period that does not exceed the remaining term of the prisoner’s incarceration, it is difficult to see how after Sandin it can be made the basis of a suit
complaining about a deprivation of liberty.” Id. at 1176.
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few and limited to when the conditions were egregious or the duration
was extreme. Shortly after the Sandin decision, the Seventh Circuit
held that “six months of segregation is not ‘such an extreme term’ and,
standing alone, would not trigger due process rights.”239 Even though
six months is six times longer than the thirty days’ solitary confinement upheld in Sandin, the Seventh Circuit has been consistent in
rejecting claims that do not meet this durational threshold. It has rejected due process protections for prisoners who experienced seventy
days of disciplinary segregation240 and six months of administrative
segregation.241 The Seventh Circuit will consider claims where isolation has exceeded six months but only if the conditions were atypically
severe. The Seventh Circuit’s Hardaway v. Meyerhoff decision involving administrative segregation for six months made clear the evidentiary bar on atypical severity is a high one, implying that anything
short of the extreme isolation such as a Supermax prison isn’t
enough.242
The Third, Sixth, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits have
likewise found that the Sandin “atypicality” comparison should “consider the conditions of confinement relative to administrative segregation.”243 As Chief Judge Posner so candidly observed, it appears that
in those four circuits it will be very difficult for an inmate to demonstrate that his or her disciplinary confinement is atypical.
2.

The Fifth Circuit

Earlier on, in 1997, the Fifth Circuit had held that a liberty interest can only occur as a result of disciplinary segregation when it “inevitably” lengthens a prisoner’s sentence—essentially the facts in
Wolff.244 The Fifth Circuit also held, in Orellana v. Kyle, that administrative segregation is an ordinary incident of prison life, and therefore
239. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added).
240. See Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1997). Thomas, a prisoner, was
housed in disciplinary segregation for seventy days with another cellmate without any access to the prison yard. Id. at 757–58.
241. Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013).
242. Id. at 744. Although Hardaway’s six months of administrative confinement was
nearly three times longer than the segregation in Thomas, “he was allowed
weekly access to the showers and prison yard.” Id. at 745. “None of the circumstances of Hardaway’s confinement come close to the harsh conditions described
in Wilkinson . . . [as he] was not deprived of all human contact and was permitted
to use the shower and prison yard once every week.” Id. at 744.
243. See Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706–08 (3d Cir. 1997); Jones v. Baker, 155
F.3d 810, 812–13 (6th Cir. 1998); Gaines v. Stenseng, 292 F.3d 1222, 1224–26
(10th Cir. 2002); Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
244. See Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1997). Revocation of good time
would effectively have increased Wolff’s sentence.
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can almost never create a liberty interest.245 This Author does not believe that these judges fail to appreciate that, in many prisons, the
only difference between administrative segregation and disciplinary
segregation is the factual predicate upon which the solitary confinement is based. The isolation cells used are typically the same for both,
as are the governing restrictions and rules.
The Fifth Circuit in Wilkerson v. Goodwin digested what it described as the leading circuit court cases, and concluded that a brightline rule was emerging as to when the duration of solitary confinement was “atypical.”246 The Court observed that “the duration in segregated confinement that courts have found does not give rise to a
liberty interest ranges up to two and one-half years.”247 Although Wilkerson cited the Second Circuit’s Palmer v. Richards decision in its
discussion of key factors to be considered when analyzing conditions of
confinement, it made no mention of Palmer or the Second Circuit’s
conflicting caselaw holding that solitary confinement of 305 days
“under normal [solitary confinement] conditions” requires procedural
due process protections.248 Because inmate Woodfox had spent an incredible thirty-nine years in solitary confinement—yes, thirty-nine
years—the Fifth Circuit’s did not have to determine a solitary confinement durational years threshold below which the court will examine
whether other conditions of confinement “are sufficiently restrictive so
as to constitute an ‘atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’ ”249 The Court concluded that, based on “the duration of the solitary confinement, the
severity of the restrictions, and their effectively indefinite nature,”250
and “[v]iewed collectively, there can be no doubt that these conditions
are sufficiently severe to give rise to a liberty interest under
Sandin.”251
The Court also had to address the defendants’ qualified immunity
defense. Defendants contended that the Fifth Circuit had assumed in
Wilkerson I252in 2003 “that a liberty interest could not arise from an
245. 65 F.3d 29, 31–32 (5th Cir. 1995).
246. 774 F.3d 845, 855 (5th Cir. 2014) [hereinafter Wilkerson II].
247. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Jones v. Baker, 155 F.3d 810, 812–13 (6th Cir.
1998)).
248. 364 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2004).
249. Wilkerson II, 774 F.3d at 855 (citation omitted). The Court also identified two
additional circuit court holdings that found eight years in “administrative custody” was atypical and “deemed sufficient to give rise to a liberty interest.” Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 856. Albert Woodfox was the inmate in Wilkerson whose due process claim
was adjudicated. Woodfox had spent an incredible thirty-nine years in solitary
confinement. While there were administrative reviews every ninety days, Woodfox contended the reviews were a “sham.” Id. at 849.
252. Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 435–36 (5th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Wilkerson
I].
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initial classification, regardless of the duration or indefiniteness of
Woodfox’s solitary confinement,”253 and therefore they were immune
from liability because their failure to provide him with a due process
hearing was objectively reasonable.
The Fifth Circuit pointed out that “the law did not freeze with the
decision in Wilkerson I in 2003”254 and that the relevant focus was on
the 2010 transfer of Woodfox to the solitary unit at the Wade Correctional Facility. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that the “Supreme
Court’s 2005 decision in Wilkinson made it clear that ‘indefinite’ placement in ‘highly restrictive conditions’ implicates a liberty interest,
even if that placement is the result of an initial classification.”255 The
Fifth Circuit held that defendants had violated “clearly established”
law because “[i]n 2010, a reasonable prison official would have been on
notice that continuing Woodfox’s solitary confinement would give rise
to a liberty interest requiring procedural protections.”256 The Court,
thus, rejected the qualified immunity defense, reasoning that “[i]n
2010, a reasonable prison official would have been on notice that continuing Woodfox’s solitary confinement would give rise to a liberty interest requiring procedural protections.”257
The Wilkerson II case was remanded to determine the adequacy of
the periodic review procedures in light of Wilkinson v. Austin.258 But
one was left with the firm impression that unless an inmate has experienced solitary confinement in excess of two-and-a-half years and
severe hardship comparable to the egregious facts in Wilkerson II, he
or she has no chance in the Fifth Circuit.
3.

The Second Circuit

The Second Circuit represents the minority view and looks to the
general population when making the atypicality comparison.259 In
Sealey v. Giltner, the Second Circuit rejected Judge Posner’s analysis
in Wagner v. Hanks: “We think Sandin does not go so far.”260 Judge
Newman, writing for the court in Sealey, explained:
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Wilkerson II, 774 F.3d at 858.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 858–59.
The Ninth and perhaps the Fourth Circuit concur. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d
1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The Sandin Court seems to suggest that a major
difference between the conditions for the general prison population and the segregated population triggers a right to a hearing.”); see also Beverati v. Smith, 120
F.3d 500, 503 (4th Cir. 1997) (comparing the conditions in administrative segregation versus the conditions in the general prison population).
260. Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 584 (2d Cir. 1999).

270

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:227

If an inmate is to be placed in atypical confinement (considering both the conditions and the duration) after being determined, for example, to be a threat
to prison safety, he should have some procedural due process surrounding the
determination that he poses such a threat. That is the teaching of Hewitt, and
if Sandin had meant to overrule Hewitt to the extent of precluding a protected
liberty interest for all administrative confinements, we would expect to see
more pointed language to that effect.261

The Second Circuit’s decision in Palmer v. Richards provided a helpful
synthesis of the circuit’s post-Sandin caselaw.262 Palmer also gave
guidance as to the type of showing of “atypical” conditions that could
trigger due process protection when the length of solitary confinement, though longer than the thirty days in Sandin, was relatively
short. The Palmer Court explained that duration and conditions of
confinement are “distinct and equally important consideration[s] in
determining whether a confinement in SHU rises to the level of ‘atypical and severe hardship.’ ”263
Sealey v. Giltner explained the Second Circuit had developed a
sliding scale approach: “Both the conditions and their duration must
be considered, since especially harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh conditions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical.”264 Unlike Sandin, which never attempted
to define what constituted “normal solitary confinement,” the Second
Circuit incorporated the definition used in New York statutes and
prison regulations.265
While the Second Circuit has not established “a bright-line rule
that a certain period of SHU confinement automatically fails to implicate due process rights,”266 it has developed, on a case-by-case basis, a
disposition framework whose foundation is based on the length of solitary confinement. In Palmer v. Richards, Judge Katzmann summa261. Id. at 585. Chief Justice Rehnquist was quite clear that the Court was not overruling Hewitt in Sandin footnote five: “[A]bandonment of Hewitt’s methodology
does not technically require us to overrule any holding of this Court . . . Although
it did locate a liberty interest in Hewitt, it concluded that due process required no
additional procedural guarantees for the inmate.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 483 n.5 (1995).
262. 364 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2004).
263. Id. at 64.
264. Sealey, 197 F.3d at 586.
265. The Palmer Court noted:
[T]he prisoner is placed in a solitary confinement cell, kept in his cell for
23 hours a day, permitted to exercise in the prison yard for one hour a
day, limited to two showers a week, and denied various privileges available to general population prisoners, such as the opportunity to work and
obtain out-of-cell schooling. Visitors [are] permitted, but the frequency
and duration [is] less than in general population. The number of books
allowed in the cell [is] also limited.
Palmer, 364 F.3d at n.3 (citing Colon v. Howard, 215 F.3d 227, 230 (2d Cir.
2000)).
266. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
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rized the caselaw and explained it had created analytical “guidelines”
of four durational tiers:267 the “exceedingly short” duration, the “relatively brief” duration, the “intermediate” or “relatively long” duration,
and the “longer than” intermediate duration.268 However, the Second
Circuit explained that it had “explicitly avoided a bright line rule that
a certain period of SHU confinement automatically fails to implicate
due process rights,”269 but the court considered the durational parameters of the four tiers to be helpful “guidelines,” reflecting its case-bycase approach.270 It appears the degree of severity of one’s confinement will be considered higher when its duration is towards the upper
end of a tier’s range, and less when the duration approaches the lower
end of a tier’s range.
(1) Exceedingly short. “[W]here the period of time spent in SHU was exceedingly short—less than the 30 days that the Sandin plaintiff spent in SHU—
and there was no indication that the plaintiff endured unusual SHU conditions,” the Court reported “it had affirmed dismissal of prisoners’ due process
claims.”271 In the Second Circuit, due process claims based on solitary confinement for less than 30 days will fail unless the prisoner can demonstrate
“especially harsh conditions [were] endured for a brief interval.”
(2) Relatively brief. Solitary confinement with durations between 31 and 100
days fall in the next category: “SHU confinements of fewer than 101 days
could constitute atypical and significant hardships if the conditions were more
severe than the normal SHU conditions of Sealey or a more fully developed
record showed that even relatively brief confinements under normal SHU conditions were, in fact, atypical.”272
(3) Intermediate. “Where the plaintiff was confined for an intermediate duration—between 101 and 305 days—‘development of a detailed record’ of the
conditions of the confinement relative to ordinary prison conditions is required.”273 When the solitary confinement falls in this intermediate range, “a
district court must ‘make a fact-intensive inquiry,’ examining ‘the actual circumstances of SHU confinement’ in the case before it without relying on its
familiarity with SHU conditions in previous cases.”274
(4) Relatively long. Colon v. Howard held when the duration of solitary confinement is 305 days or longer, duration alone is sufficient, without more, to
trigger due process protection.275 The Court reasoned: “A confinement longer
than an intermediate one, and under “normal SHU conditions,” is “a sufficient
departure from the ordinary incidents of prison life to require procedural due
process protections under Sandin.”276
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.

Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 64–66.
Id. at 64.
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 65–66 (citation omitted).
Id. at 65 (citations omitted).
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 65 (citations omitted). Future cases will determine whether the current
durational ceiling should be lowered and whether the conditions of must be somewhat more severe than normal.
275. 215 F.3d 227, 232 (2d Cir. 2000).
276. Palmer, 364 F.3d at 65 (footnote omitted) (citing Colon, 215 F.3d at 231).
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The Circuit Split

Perhaps the most striking example of circuit inconsistency is the
fact that the durational threshold for the Fifth Circuit is at least triple
that of the Second Circuit. Wilkerson’s threshold has ambiguity—twoand-a-half years, or 913 days—appears to be insufficient in duration
to make out a claim. But assuming arguendo that is the minimum
threshold in the Fifth Circuit, it is nearly triple Palmer’s 305-days
threshold. The disparity between the two circuits is actually greater,
because the Fifth Circuit considers 913 days’ duration as sufficient to
qualify as a viable claim for due process protection only when there is
also atypical severity of the confinement conditions. In contrast, the
Second Circuit holds due process protections are required if solitary
confinement exceeds 305 days under “normal” solitary conditions; no
additional evidence of severity or atypicality is required. Although the
Fifth Circuit caselaw is incredibly harsh, the reality is that the Second
Circuit’s more moderate view is also a dramatic departure from the
Supreme Court’s pre-Sandin caselaw.
The federal circuit caselaw confirms that the federal courts
grasped the symbolism and new direction of Sandin and have imposed
an extremely grudging threshold standard that inmates have had to
meet in cases where the harshest of prison disciplines has been invoked: solitary confinement. The Sandin standard’s “atypicality” requirement has a greater resemblance to Eighth Amendment caselaw
than to the Due Process cases. The core of my criticism isn’t that the
Sandin test is vague and ambiguous, or that it lacks a nexus to the
facts in Sandin, or that it has resulted in a myriad of lower court opinions reaching disparate results. It fails on all three of those counts.
With regard to the latter count, which is the most serious, the federal
circuit courts are disparate only in how high a degree of difficulty they
will impose on prisoners claiming a solitary confinement due process
violation.
IV. A TRAGIC LOSS: THE SANDIN DISSENTERS FAILED TO
CALL OUT THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND THEREBY
MISSED AN OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE
A MIDDLE GROUND RESOLUTION
There was considerable tension in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s express embrace of Wolff as the touchstone of the Court’s new test and
its silent rejection of Wolff’s pointed instruction that due process protections would apply not only to revocation of good time but also to the
imposition of solitary confinement.277 Due process’s applicability to
277. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 571 n.19 (1974).
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solitary confinement had been considered settled law,278 and surely
was settled law after Wright, Hughes, and Hewitt had been decided,
and had been treated as such by lower courts. The Court’s tradition of
principled decision-making required that it address existing solitary
confinement precedent head-on, as such longstanding precedent warranted. Stare decisis requires very careful consideration of precedent
before it is overturned, and that clearly did not happen in Sandin.279
The Court cited no precedent for its new test’s choice of terminology—
that due process only applies when solitary confinement is not only
severe but “atypical.”280 There was no mention of “atypicality” in Morrissey or Wolff. “Atypical” would seem appropriate for a claim under
the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, but
it is inherently contrary to the traditional fundamental fairness that
the Due Process Clause seeks to ensure for all.
Justice Breyer twice referred to the Sandin “atypical, severe hardship” test as radical and potentially “chang[ing] prior law radically.”281 However, neither dissent called out the Chief Justice and
the majority by explaining that its decision wasn’t just a reduction of
the process due before an inmate could be placed in solitary confinement, but a total abolition of due process protections in all but extreme cases.282 The consequence of Sandin for the future was not
merely a step down in process, that is—replacing the Wolff procedural
safeguards with the Greenholtz-Hewitt nonadversary procedural safeguards. Instead, Sandin’s holding meant no due process protections
whatsoever except in extreme solitary confinement cases.
Because Conner had been afforded a limited hearing, the full implications of the radical new Sandin test were hidden because the
Chief Justice’s holding didn’t forecast its full scope: “We hold, therefore, that neither the Hawaii prison regulation in question, nor the
278. Although Wolff’s discussion of solitary confinement technically was dictum because the factual basis for the petitioner’s discipline involved revocation of goodtime credit (and not the imposition of solitary confinement), it is common for the
Court to give guidance in analogous situations. See id. at 601 n.9. In Wolff, the
TCA provision that was the basis for the state-created liberty interest when good
time was forfeited also expressly applied when solitary confinement was imposed.
It is also true that Wolff’s treatment of solitary confinement was in a footnote;
however, this Author is unaware that principles stated in a footnote have a diminished status, and certainly not when the Court unequivocally expressed its
reasoning and rationale and the vote on this issue was unanimous.
279. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–86 (1995).
280. Id. at 483.
281. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 496–97 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
282. Justice Breyer’s vague attempt at an explanation totally let the majority off the
hook: “If so, its generality threatens the law with uncertainty, for some lower
courts may read the majority opinion as offering significantly less protection
against deprivation of liberty, while others may find in it an extension of protection to certain ‘atypical’ hardships that preexisting law would not have covered.”
Id. at 496.
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Due Process Clause itself, afforded Conner a protected liberty interest
that would entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in
Wolff.”283 The Court did not decide the case under the Morrissey stage
two “what process is due” stage. Given the uniformity of solitary confinement due process precedents from Wolff through Hewitt, it was
surprising that Sandin was decided at the Morrissey stage one:
whether Conner’s thirty-days solitary confinement disciplinary violation triggered a liberty interest requiring due process protection.284
The Court didn’t explain that not only was Conner not entitled to
the full Wolff procedural protections, but he was entitled to no procedural protections whatsoever. Indeed, in the Majority’s view, Conner
had been afforded more process than he was constitutionally entitled
by virtue of its new ruling in Sandin. The Court didn’t explain that its
holding would not merely result in a reduction of the process due to
Conner and future inmates, but would result in a total abolition of due
process protections in all but extreme cases. To restate, what the
Court didn’t explain was that its new test would foreclose all procedural safeguards in most solitary confinement cases. Unfortunately,
neither dissent forced the Chief Justice to acknowledge the sweeping
scope of the Sandin holding, which allowed Sandin’s radical change to
largely pass under the radar.
Recall that Sandin was not a case in which the inmate was completely denied all procedural safeguards. Conner was given notice, afforded an opportunity to speak at his misconduct “hearing,” and was
allowed to take an internal appeal on which he prevailed as the prison
authorities “found the high misconduct charge unsupported and expunged Conner’s disciplinary record with respect to that charge.”285
The success of Conner’s administrative appeal—of course —did not
erase the hardship Conner experienced in solitary confinement while
his administrative appeal progressed. He had served the entire thirtyday discipline by the time his appeal was resolved. But all the procedural safeguards that Conner was actually afforded by the Hawaii
prison officials would now, under the Sandin holding, be matters of
grace and no longer constitutionally required in future cases.
As the dissent viewed the case, the fighting issue was at stage two
of the Morrissey-Wolff due process analysis, the “what process is due”
stage: whether, under Wolff, the prison authorities were justified in
denying Conner’s request to call witnesses to testify on his behalf.286
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 487.
Id. at 485–87.
Id. at 476.
Wolff had provided a presumptive right to “call witnesses and present documentary evidence in [the inmate’s] defense when permitting [the inmate] to do so will
not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974) (emphasis added).
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The dissenters would have remanded to the district court to hold a
hearing and make this determination. The Majority took an entirely
different tack, and in doing so ignored the canon of constitutional
avoidance, which counsels that federal courts should decline to rule on
a constitutional issue if the case can be resolved on other grounds.287
Instead, the Majority crafted a grudging new due process test that effectively eliminates due process protections except in the most egregious solitary confinement circumstances. Because Conner was
afforded a limited hearing, the process provided him tended to hide or
disguise the full implications of the Supreme Court’s far-reaching
ruling.
Let’s explain what the Court did not do and what other less severe
options it had. First, it did not hold that while Conner’s disciplinary
solitary confinement triggered the Wolff due process protections under
existing law, the notice and limited hearing provided Conner was sufficient to satisfy due process due to the Wolff “unduly hazardous to
institutional safety or correctional goals” exception. That is, the Court
might have held that the Hawaii prison officials’ reason for denying
Conner’s request to call witnesses—based on their unavailability—
was justified on the facts, under the Wolff exception.
Second, the Court did not hold that the Court needed to reconsider
“what process was due” in the context of prison discipline involving
solitary confinement, using the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. A
more candid approach would have advised that the earlier precedents,
beginning with Wolff and concluding with Hewitt, needed to be revisited because of pressures resulting from an explosion in the nation’s
prison population in the fifteen years since 1980. In 2005, in Wilkinson v. Austin, a case involving due process requirements in a
Supermax prison setting, the Court acknowledged that prison management issues had become the dominant factor in its stage two Mathews balancing equation. The Court in Sandin might have taken a
similar approach and determined that, given the much larger prison
populations, continued requirement of the Wolff procedures, especially
hearings that involved witnesses, would put too great a burden on
prison management. The proper rebalance might have been the informal, non-adversarial procedures the Court had set forth in Greenholtz-Hewitt: notice of the charges; an opportunity to be heard in
person; and a written statement of disposition that need not summarize the evidence but demonstrates that the “decisionmaker review[ed] the charges and [ ] evidence against the prisoner.”288
287. See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
288. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476 (1983); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (holding that in an informal,
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The Court would have had at least two alternative ways to do this.
Traditional principles of constitutional litigation would have led the
Court to frame its holding, and any generally applicable test it might
fashion, and base it on the facts in the case before it.
One alternative would have been for the Court to hold that shortterm disciplinary solitary confinement, such as thirty days, triggered
a liberty interest under the Constitution and the accompanying due
process protections; however, the Mathews balancing equation did not
require the full Wolff due process protections, but only the provision of
Greenholtz-Hewitt informal, non-adversarial procedures. Since Hawaii
did provide notice and an opportunity for Conner to present his case,
the Court would dismiss Conner’s claim because in fact Conner had
been provided procedures that satisfied Greenholtz-Hewitt. This approach would have avoided the Court prescribing its sweeping “atypical, significant hardship” test.289 It would have left in place the Wolff
procedural protections when solitary confinement was for a longer
term than thirty days or was indefinite. The informal, non-adversarial
procedures approach would have been a familiar one for Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for it was he who wrote the opinion in Hewitt. Would any
of the dissenters have joined the majority based on this latter approach? I would think so. Hindsight suggests that informal, non-adversarial procedures for solitary confinements of thirty days or less,
and Wolff procedures for longer term confinements, would have been a
far better and more balanced approach than the bleak solitary confinement experience that almost all prisoners have had under Sandin.
A second alternative would have been for the Court to have held
that short-term disciplinary solitary confinement, such as thirty days,
was not a severe hardship and did not create a liberty interest arising
under the constitution; thus, no due process protections attached to
Conner’s short-term solitary confinement. Again, the Court would not
have prescribed its “atypical, significant hardship” test. Therefore, the
Court would not have reached the questions of whether longer term
solitary confinements trigger a liberty interest, and, if so, what process would be due. The Sandin dissenters would still have taken issue
with this latter option being taken because existing precedent, informed by psychological and mental health science, held that solitary
confinement is so inhumane that even short-term solitary confinement constitutes a “grievous loss,” triggering due process protection.
But such a holding would have assured that the Wolff procedures were
still required when longer periods of solitary confinement were imposed—or at least would have left for future decision whether
non-adversarial hearing the decisionmaker need not “specify the particular ‘evidence’ . . . on which it rests [its] determination”).
289. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
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lengthier periods of solitary confinement and/or more severe conditions would trigger due process protections.
Hindsight, of course, is twenty-twenty. Perhaps the reason that the
dissenters did not press the Majority as to the scope of its holding was
astonishment at the breadth of the change; shifting from unanimous
Court holdings in Wolff and Hewitt, and Hughes’ 6-2 ruling, to
Sandin’s 5-4 holding that solitary confinement will only trigger due
process protections in extreme or egregious cases. But, by not calling
out the majority, there were two adverse consequences. First, the full
scope and extremely harsh consequences of the Sandin “atypical, significant hardship” test was hidden and did not receive the negative
public scrutiny it deserved, because Conner had been afforded the basic Wolff procedural protections at Conner’s disciplinary hearing and
eventually succeeded on his internal administrative appeal. Second,
an opportunity to negotiate with the majority on any of the above suggested intermediate dispositions was lost. One would think the Chief
Justice might have been willing to give some ground in order to obtain
a broader consensus for the Court’s disposition of the case. Instead,
due process protections for solitary confinement went over the abyss
into a deep black hole.
Despite Sandin’s many ambiguities, the federal circuit courts were
quick to recognize that its test had forged new law nullifying the due
process rights of prisoners except in extreme cases, and thereby provided the vehicle by which those courts could significantly reduce
their prisoner case dockets. The federal circuit courts did not view the
factual basis for Sandin’s holding—that the imposition of thirty days
in disciplinary solitary confinement did not give rise to a constitutional claim entitling an inmate to due process procedural protections—as in any way limiting the scope of Sandin’s atypical, severe
hardship test. Sandin’s law revision, which Justice Breyer characterized as “radical,” has proven to be a dramatic departure from existing
law. The federal circuits were zealous in their embrace, and it is evident that many judges viewed Sandin as liberating.
The Chief Justice pursued a different, uncompromising course intent upon forging what Justice Breyer and the dissenters feared—a
radical change in the underlying constitutional law. The Court never
forthrightly stated that its holding meant that the prisoner, Conner,
was entitled to no due process protections whatsoever—but that is the
reality of its holding. The Chief Justice did not explicitly state that the
Court would have upheld Conner’s solitary confinement even had he
been provided no notice, no hearing, no process at all, but that is brutal reality of its holding. The title of this article characterizes Sandin
as a “hijacking.” This may be harsh, but it accurately describes the
reality of the Court’s ruling—the stealth rationale, the obliviousness
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to the inhumanity of solitary confinement, and the total disregard of
its own precedent.
The Court employed a howitzer when only surgical instruments
were needed. The facts were treated as irrelevant in the Court’s rush
to return to the “hands off” federal courts’ policy preceding Morrissey
and Wolff. The success of Conner’s internal appeal demonstrated this
was not a minor claim and the importance of fair process. The facts
demonstrated how important due process protections are to minimize
the risk of an erroneous decision and the wrongful imposition of prison
discipline. The Court’s stated concern about “squandering judicial recourses” on “minor prison” misconduct matters had nothing to do with
the instant case, which prison authorities charged as “high misconduct” with disciplinary segregation up to thirty days. The Court’s decision totally blinks the factual reality that, after Conner was confined
in solitary for thirty days, the prison authorities “found the high misconduct charge unsupported and expunged Conner’s disciplinary record with respect to that charge.”290 Had he been afforded a full and
fair hearing at the outset, surely he would have been spared from solitary confinement that, although treated as typical by the Sandin Majority, is double the maximum time period that is emerging as the
international standard in the twenty-first century.
V. REINVIGORATING DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS IN THE
CONTEXT OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Sandin did not put in question any aspect of the continuing vitality
of the landmark Morrissey v. Brewer due process ruling in the parole
revocation context. Indeed, Morrissey was fully embraced and reconfirmed in the Court’s unanimous decision in Young v. Harper, decided
two years after Sandin.291 However, the due process solitary confine290. Id. at 476.
291. Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 152–53 (1997). Oklahoma “operated two programs under which inmates were conditionally released from prison before the
expiration of their sentences. One was parole, the other “Preparole Conditional
Supervision Program.” Id. at 145. The latter program was in effect whenever the
prison population exceeded 95% of capacity. After reviewing Ernest Harper’s
criminal record and prison conduct, the parole board recommended him for parole
and released him from prison under the Conditional Program. Harper found
housing and obtained and maintained a job, and “lived a life generally free of the
incidents of imprisonment” for five months. Id. at 148. Then the Governor denied
Harper’s parole. He was told to report back to prison, which he did.
Harper challenged “his summary return to prison” as a deprivation of liberty
without due process per Morrissey. The State contended that Harper’s reincarceration was nothing more than a transfer to a higher degree of confinement, and
therefore was permissible under Meachum without a due process hearing requirement. Id.
Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the unanimous Harper Court: “The essence of parole is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the
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ment caselaw that Sandin spawned has resulted in the radical law
change governing internal prison discipline that Justice Breyer
feared. The record is clear that Sandin, as construed by the federal
circuit courts, essentially eliminated due process protection in the imposition of solitary confinement in all but the most extreme cases.
Yes, there was a consensus on the Court that the lower federal
courts had misconstrued its precedent and as a result their attention
had sometimes been diverted to minor disputes. As Justice Breyer explained, only a minor course correction was needed, not major surgery.
Indeed, although none of the Justices mentioned it, congressional legislative reform was on the horizon, and the legislative process would
have allowed congressional hearings with all the stakeholders at the
table. Legislative reform permits a more comprehensive solution, and
it also enables incremental improvement by tweaking the initial legislative product based on experience and feedback. Appellate adjudication, especially when it results in constitutional rules, does not permit
such a comprehensive approach, and is typically confined to the facts
of specific cases and the litigation strategies of the parties. Because of
deference to precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis, it is more difficult to correct mistakes that have been blazoned into constitutional
law.
We now know Congress did enact the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(PLRA) in 1996, one year after Sandin, and that legislation comprehensively addressed concerns regarding the purported “flood” of frivolous prisoners’ litigation faced by the courts. There are many,
including this Author, who believe the PLRA went way too far—virtually a scorched earth approach to the problem. But legislation clearly
was the preferred way to reform prisoner litigation excesses. Distorting constitutional law, especially its fundamental law of due process, was not. The PLRA, thus, provides important context that wasn’t
present when the Court forged Sandin in 1995, but its omnipresence
will continue to ensure that prisoners won’t flood the federal courts
with litigation if due process protections are restored to solitary confinement cases by Court ruling or legislative action.
In the final footnote eleven to his Sandin opinion Chief Justice
Rehnquist issued what was purported to be an assurance, but could
also be viewed as a challenge:
condition that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.” Id. at 147 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972)). The
Harper Court held that Oklahoma’s pre-parole conditional supervision program
was sufficiently similar to parole to require the Morrissey due process protections: “The fact that “participation in the [pre-parole] Program was ordered by
the Board [of Parole], while the Governor conferred parole” was held an insignificant difference “from parole as we described it in Morrissey.” Id. at 152 (quoting
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 477–78 (1972)).
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Prisoners such as Conner, of course, retain other protection from arbitrary
state action even within the expected conditions of confinement. They may
invoke the First and Eighth Amendments and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment where appropriate, and may draw upon internal
prison grievance procedures and state judicial review where available.292

Footnote eleven leaves no doubt that the Court appreciated that its
ruling meant that the federal courts would be significantly curtailing
prisoners’ due process protections. No doubt inmates and prisoners’
rights advocates found its assurance that inmates were not completely
without protection from arbitrary prison discipline of little solace. Although footnote eleven was quite vague about the state judicial review
it referenced, hopefully it will serve as a reminder to prisoners and
their advocates that federal constitutional law sets the minimum floor
in terms of individual rights and those rights can be bolstered by state
supreme courts construing their state constitutions, by legislatures, at
the state or federal level, and—on the ground—by state departments
of corrections and prison administration.293
I will take up the Chief Justice’s challenge and will write a third
Article, Reinvigorating Due Process Protections in the Context of Solitary Confinement Starts with Reforming Sandin & Wilkinson. I will
urge the Court to overrule Sandin and will explore how that can be
done given stare decisis principles. As a fallback, I will suggest the
damage done by Sandin can be significantly minimized by the Court
limiting the Sandin holding to its facts and dispatching with the
“atypical, severe hardship” test. Various options on how this might be
done will be explored.
The Sandin Court turned its back on two decades of precedent, dispatching it with a dismissive sentence. Would not the following observation of Chief Justice Roberts be directly on point and provide the
compass for reconsideration of Sandin?:
Stare decisis principles also determine how we handle a decision that itself
departed from the cases that came before it. In those instances, “remaining
true to an ‘intrinsically sounder’ doctrine established in prior cases better
serves the values of stare decisis than would following” the recent
departure.294

To what extent does the Court’s overruling of Roe v. Wade affect
stare decisis jurisprudence?295
Reinvigorating Due Process will take a deep dive into the Supreme
Court’s only other venture into the thicket that is due process in the
292. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n.11.
293. See Russell E. Lovell, II, Reinvigorating Due Process Protections in the Context of
Solitary Confinement Starts with Reforming Sandin & Wilkinson (forthcoming
2022).
294. June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, J., concurring)
(“The legal doctrine of stare decisis requires us, absent special circumstances, to
treat like cases alike.”).
295. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Org., 142 S. Ct. 2228 (2022).
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context of solitary confinement: Wilkinson v. Austin.296 Sandin and
Wilkinson can be viewed as bookends, with Sandin representing what
a 5-4 divided Court characterized as “typical” solitary confinement,
short in duration at 30 days, and which Sandin held did not trigger
due process protection. Wilkinson was a unanimous Court that found
that due process protection was required before a prisoner could be
assigned to the “atypical solitary”confinement at a brand new Ohio
Supermax prison where every prisoner experienced “extreme isolation” for an indefinite period of time, with no chance of parole. However, the Wilkinson Court’s resolution of the second stage of the
Morrissey-Wolff “process due” analysis was an absolute train wreck.
Despite the district court’s uncontested findings of a pattern and practice of constitutional violations over four years, the Supreme Court
nonetheless upheld a last-ditch policy promulgated by the State while
the trial was underway—a policy which post-trial was found never to
have been implemented at which the State then contended that despite the assurances it gave the Court at oral argument, it need not
implement. Intrigued?
Reform is definitely not limited to the Supreme Court. Springing
from the suggestions in Sandin’s footnote eleven, the article will also
explore the state constitutional law approach that recognizes the Federal constitution’s protections provide a floor, and not a ceiling on individual rights. State supreme courts, under their independent
authority to construe the due process clauses of their constitutions,
can provide their residents, and those visiting their states, with
greater protections.
Legislative reform, similar to the Nebraska Treatment & Corrections Act of 1969, may be the most likely systemic option at this historical moment. There have been exciting developments in the past
half dozen years since the adoption of the Mandela Rules by the
United Nations General Assembly in 2015. The pendulum has begun
to swing back in favor of prisoner rights in the public policy and legislative arenas. Among the Mandela Rules is a prohibition of “solitary
confinement for a time period in excess of 15 consecutive days,”297 a
position since embraced by the National Commission on Correctional
Health298 and the State of New York. New York’s Humane Alternatives to Solitary Confinement (HALT) Act, which was signed into law
296. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
297. G.A. Res. 70/175, at 16–17 (Dec. 17, 2015).
298. New Position Statement Provides Guidance on Solitary Confinement, NAT’L
COMM’N ON CORR. HEALTH CARE, (Apr. 19, 2016) https://www.ncchc.org/solitaryconfinement-position-statement [https://perma.cc/W6NE-32H5]; see also American Bar Association Resolution 108A, (2018) https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2018-midyear/2018-mm-108a.pdf [https://
perma.cc/A2SZ-RKCV] (urging enactment of laws ensuring that “solitary confinement . . . typically [does not] exceed 15 consecutive days.”).
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in April 2021,299 restricted the use of segregated confinement for all
incarcerated persons to fifteen days. What a dramatic contrast to the
federal courts’ post-Sandin caselaw! Significant legislative limitations
on solitary confinement have occurred in more than a dozen states,
including Nebraska,300 since 2015. So, yes, legislative reform must be
considered a promising alternative.

299. See Senate Passes the ‘HALT’ Solitary Confinement Act, N.Y. STATE SEN. (Mar.
18, 2021) https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senate-passes-haltsolitary-confinement-act [https://perma.cc/U59L-9DC4].
300. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-173.03 (Cum. Supp. 2020).

